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ABSTRAC T. In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that a lawyer's failure to advise
her noncitizen client of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea constitutes deficient
performance of counsel in violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. In the plea
context, defendants are also protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination and the Due Process Clause, which requires that judges and defendants engage in
a conversation regarding the consequences of the plea- the so-called "plea colloquy" -before the
defendant can enter a valid guilty plea.
In many plea colloquies, judges issue general warnings to defendants regarding the
immigration consequences of a guilty plea. Since Padilla, a number of lower courts have held that
such general court warnings prevent a defendant from proving prejudice and prevailing on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim where there might otherwise be a Padilla Sixth
Amendment violation.
This Note argues that those rulings mistakenly conflate the role of the court in a Fifth
Amendment plea colloquy and the role of counsel under the Sixth Amendment and, further, that
they misread the clear directives of Padilla. In the plea context, the court and defense counsel
serve complementary but distinct functions in our constitutional structure; neither can replace
the other, and the failure of either court or counsel constitutes a breakdown in our system.
Circumscribing Padilla's requirements by allowing plea colloquies to "cure" the prejudice created
by Sixth Amendment Padilla violations is problematic because the Fifth Amendment plea
colloquy provides significantly less protection to criminal defendants. Thus, the substitution of
the plea colloquy for advice from counsel will substantially undercut the Padilla decision.
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PADILLA V. KENTUCKY: THE EFFECT OF PLEA COLLOOUY WARNINGS
INTRODUCTION
In 2010, the Supreme Court held in Padilla v. Kentucky' that a lawyer's
failure to advise her noncitizen client of the deportation consequences of a
guilty plea constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of a
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. As with many landmark decisions, the
ruling left several unanswered questions for the lower courts to decide. The
answers to those questions have the capability to either considerably expand or
limit the practical effects of the decision on litigants. The purpose of this Note
is to analyze one unanswered question left in Padilla's wake that could have the
effect of seriously circumscribing the protection that Padilla provides.
The test for ineffective assistance of counsel, established in Strickland v.
Washington, has two parts: a defendant must first show that her counsel was
constitutionally deficient and then show that the deficiency prejudiced the
result of her case.' In cases involving guilty pleas, a defendant must show that
in the absence of deficient counsel she would have insisted on going to trial.'
Defendants are also protected by the Due Process Clause, which requires that
judges and defendants engage in a conversation regarding the consequences of
the plea-the so-called "plea colloquy" -before defendants can enter valid
guilty pleas. The plea colloquy is meant to ensure that the plea is knowing and
voluntary. While not required by the Fifth Amendment, many states mandate
that judges issue general warnings to defendants regarding the immigration
consequences of a guilty plea.' Since Padilla, a number of lower courts have
held that such general court warnings prevent a defendant from proving
prejudice and prevailing on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim where
there might otherwise be a Sixth Amendment Padilla violation.s
This Note argues that those rulings mistakenly conflate the role of the
court in Fifth Amendment plea colloquies and the role of counsel under the
Sixth Amendment, and, further, that they misread the clear directives of
Padilla. Such circumscribing of Padilla's requirements is problematic because
the Fifth Amendment plea colloquy provides significantly less protection to
1. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
2. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
3. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
4. See Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and
Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 148 & n.116 (collecting
sources).
5. See infra Subsection I11I.B.2.
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criminal defendants, and thus the substitution of the plea colloquy for advice
from counsel will substantially undercut the Padilla decision.
The Note proceeds in six parts. Part I discusses the Court's doctrines on the
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and the Fifth
Amendment plea colloquy requirement. It argues that these two protections
serve complementary but distinct functions in our constitutional structure-
neither can replace the other, and the failure of either constitutes a breakdown
in our system. Part I also discusses the background of Padilla v. Kentucky and
highlights the constitutional concerns that arise when courts pay insufficient
attention to the distinct roles of the court during the plea colloquy and counsel
in the guilty plea context. Prior to Padilla, lower courts nearly uniformly
imported the collateral consequences rule, designed to limit the requirements
of the court in the Fifth Amendment plea colloquy, into the Sixth Amendment
context to limit the responsibilities of counsel. The application of this rule then
directed lower courts' holdings that counsel was not required to advise
defendants regarding the immigration consequences of their pleas, leading to
the challenge in Padilla.
Part II describes the Court's decision in Padilla, which rejected the
importation of the collateral consequences rule into the Sixth Amendment
context. Under Padilla, a defendant can establish that her counsel was deficient
if her attorney failed to advise her of the immigration consequences of a guilty
plea. However, the Padilla decision did not address the prejudice prong of the
Strickland test, and therefore left many questions of application unanswered.
Part II explains how courts may circumscribe Padilla's protections by using
plea colloquy warnings to negate findings of prejudice in Sixth Amendment
Padilla claims. Part III provides an in-depth account of how courts have
implemented Padilla thus far, focusing particularly on how plea colloquies
affect findings of prejudice. Part IV argues that the lower courts' use of plea
colloquies to negate findings of prejudice in Padilla claims repeats the mistake
made by lower courts regarding the importation of the collateral consequences
rule into the Sixth Amendment by paying scant attention to the distinct
functions of counsel and judge in the plea context. Given their distinct
functions in the system, general plea colloquy warnings represent very weak
evidence that the deficiency of counsel did not prejudice the defendant's
decision to accept a guilty plea offer. Further, Part IV argues that both the
language and logic of Padilla directly oppose the conclusion that a plea colloquy
warning cures the deficiency of counsel.
Part V highlights the particular importance of maintaining the robust
protection mandated by Padilla for noncitizen defendants facing possible
deportation if they plead guilty to a crime. Padilla's mandate is all the more
crucial given the prevalence of guilty pleas, the harshness of the current
948
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immigration laws, and the low rates of representation for noncitizens in
removal proceedings. Finally, Part VI concludes by outlining possible strategic
considerations for litigators challenging the lower court decisions.
I. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND FIFTH
AMENDMENT PLEA COLLOQUIES: COMPLEMENTS, NOT
SUBSTITUTES IN THE CONTEXT OF GUILTY PLEAS
A. The Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Fifth
Amendment Voluntary Waiver Requirement
A defendant entering into the plea bargaining stage is protected by both the
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, which entitles him to
the guidance of a proficient defense attorney, and the Fifth Amendment Due
Process requirement that a valid guilty plea be "knowing," "intelligent," and
"voluntary."6 These two rights, both well-established in Supreme Court
jurisprudence, work in tandem to ensure that the adversarial process functions
fairly, not only in trials, but in plea bargains as well.
Since 1970, the Supreme Court has recognized that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel is the right "to the effective assistance of competent counsel,"7
6. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); see also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
242-43 (1969).
7. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (emphasis added). The concept of effective
assistance of counsel was first articulated by the Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932). However, that case addressed the right to counsel as embodied in the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, before Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963), incorporated the Sixth Amendment against the states. Therefore, the holding in
Powell was limited to extreme cases:
All that it is necessary now to decide . . . is that in a capital case, where the
defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his
own defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is
the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a
necessary requisite of due process of law; and that duty is not discharged by an
assignment at such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving
of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case.
287 U.S. at 71. McMann v. Richardson was the first case to discuss the right to effective
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. 397 U.S. at 771; see Richard Klein, The
Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 629 (1986); Virginia Hatch, Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel and the U.S. Supreme Court: History and Development of a
Constitutional Standard 14 (Oct. 1, 2009) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Boise State University),
http://scholarworks.boisestate.edu/crimjustgradproj/1.
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because it "envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of the
adversarial system to produce just results." In its 1984 decision in Strickland v.
Washington, the Court outlined a two-part test for ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. In order to prevail, a defendant must show: (i) "that counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment," and (2) that "the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense."9 As to the first requirement, the Court
held that counsel's performance should be analyzed under an "objective
standard of reasonableness," relying on benchmarks for prevailing norms of
practice such as the American Bar Association standards."o The Strickland
threshold is difficult to meet. In applying the first prong, courts should be
"highly deferential" in scrutinizing counsel's performance in order to mitigate
the effects of hindsight." Further, where the defendant successfully
demonstrates deficient performance, he must also "affirmatively prove
prejudice."" Where lack of prejudice is clear, courts need not first determine
whether the performance was deficient."
One year after Strickland, in Hill v. Lockhart," the Court applied the
Strickland analysis to ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the guilty plea
context. The Court held that in order to satisfy the prejudice requirement
where a defendant pled guilty, "the defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."" This test erects a high bar
for success. However, by applying the Strickland analysis to the plea context,
the Court recognized the modern reality that, in many cases, advice on plea
bargaining is the most important service that the defense bar provides to its
clients. Given that the vast majority of all criminal convictions are the result of
guilty pleas,' 6 the Hill ruling was pivotal to maintaining the right to counsel in
criminal cases.
8. Stricidand v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
9. Id. at 687.
1o. Id. at 688.
n1. Id. at 689.
12. Id. at 693.
13. Id. at 697.
14. 474 U.S. 52 (1985)-
15. Id. at 59.
i6. Recent reports indicate that well over 90% of both state and federal convictions are the
result of guilty pleas. See infra notes 194-197 and accompanying text.
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In the plea bargaining context, a defendant is protected by the Fifth
Amendment in addition to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In Boykin v.
Alabama" and Brady v. United States,'8 the Court recognized that a guilty plea
constitutes a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination as
well as a waiver of the right to a trial by jury and the right to confront one's
accusers. Therefore, the Due Process Clause requires that, in order that the
waiver of these rights be valid, the guilty plea must be knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent." It is the responsibility of the court, through the plea colloquy, to
ensure the validity of the waiver before accepting the plea.2 o Where a plea is
entered involuntarily, it must be set aside as invalid."' The voluntariness of a
plea must be evaluated "by considering all of the relevant circumstances
surrounding it."" Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure" (and its
state analogues),' which requires that the court inform the defendant of the
various consequences of his plea in a colloquy preceding acceptance of the plea,
is designed to meet the Fifth Amendment waiver requirement." Where the
court fails to properly execute a Rule 11 plea colloquy and thus ensure a valid
plea, a defendant can vacate his plea on the grounds that his waiver was not
knowing or voluntary." However, as in the context of the Sixth Amendment
17. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
18. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
19. Id. at 748.
20. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243-44 ("What is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment
demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the
accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its
consequence. When the judge discharges that function, he leaves a record adequate for any
review . . , .") (reversing the conviction where the record "[did] not disclose that the
defendant voluntarily and understandingly entered his pleas of guilty" (quoting Boykin v.
State, 207 So. 2d 412, 415 (Ala. 1968))).
21. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
22. Id. at 749.
23. FED. R. CRiM. P. ii.
24. See, e.g., ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 11; OHIO R. CluM. P. 1; W. VA. R. CRM. P. ii.
25. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969) (" [A]lthough the procedure embodied
in Rule n1 has not been held to be constitutionally mandated, it is designed to assist the
district judge in making the constitutionally required determination that a defendant's
guilty plea is truly voluntary." (citation omitted)).
26. Id. at 471-72 ("We ... conclude that prejudice inheres in a failure to comply with Rule ni, for
noncompliance deprives the defendant of the Rule's procedural safeguards that are designed
to facilitate a more accurate determination of the voluntariness of his plea.").
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standard, the defendant must show that the Rule i deficiency was
prejudicial. 7
B. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and Fifth Amendment-Mandated
Court Plea Colloquy: Complementary but Distinct Roles in Our Criminal
Justice System
While the Fifth Amendment duties of the court and the Sixth Amendment
responsibilities of defendant's counsel in the plea context are intimately related
in their roles protecting the defendant in the criminal justice system, they are
complements, not substitutes, in our constitutional structure. If the Fifth
Amendment plea colloquy were sufficient to protect defendants at the plea
bargaining stage, the right to counsel would be unnecessary for those
defendants who choose to plead guilty rather than go to trial. However, the
Court has repeatedly recognized that "defendants cannot be left to the mercies
of incompetent counsel" at the plea bargaining stage.28 Therefore, the plea
colloquy alone is not sufficient to protect a defendant's rights at the guilty plea
stage of the criminal process. Likewise, effective assistance of counsel does not
negate the court's duty to ensure the voluntariness of a plea. Boykin and its
progeny established the independent importance of the court's duty to create a
record determining the voluntariness of a plea. In McCarthy v. United States,29
the Court set aside a guilty plea that was accepted in violation of Rule it, even
though the defendant had been represented by counsel throughout.'o Taken
together, McMann, Boykin, McCarthy and their progeny clearly demonstrate
that competent counsel does not negate the need for a Fifth Amendment plea
colloquy ensuring voluntariness; and vice versa, a competent Fifth Amendment
plea colloquy cannot negate the requirement of competent counsel at every
critical stage of the criminal process.
27. The expansive rule applied in McCarthy-that all Rule ii deviations merit setting aside a
guilty plea-was limited by a subsequent amendment to Rule ii: "A variance from the
requirements of this rule is harmless error if it does not affect substantial rights." FED. R.
CRIM. P. 11(h). The Supreme Court has interpreted the rule to mean that defendants can
only rely on Rule ii violations to set aside verdicts if they can demonstrate prejudice-i.e.,
that but for the violation, they would not have pled guilty. See United States v. Dominguez
Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004).
28. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58
(1985) (applying the Strickland test to the guilty plea context).
29. McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 459.
30. While the Court now requires a demonstration of prejudice, akin to the requirement in the
Sixth Amendment context, McCarthy's central holding, the necessity of a court colloquy
ensuring a voluntary plea, remains valid.
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The Court's insistence on the assurance of the voluntariness of every guilty
plea through a plea colloquy and on effective counsel for all defendants at the
guilty plea stage accords with the distinct goals that the two protections serve
in our constitutional system. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[ii n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense."" The Supreme Court has repeatedly
emphasized that the purpose of the Sixth Amendment is to "protect[] the
unaided layman at critical confrontations with his adversary"" by providing
"the right to rely on counsel as a 'medium' between him[self] and the State.""
In other words, the right to counsel is "intended to minimize the public
prosecutor's tremendous advantage over lay persons,"34 and thus "level the
adversarial playing field, thereby promoting balance and fairness within the
criminal justice system."s Thus, the goal of the Sixth Amendment is broad in
scope; it serves to protect not only individual defendants, but also the integrity
of the entire criminal justice system by ensuring that imbalances of power do
not subvert the adversarial process upon which our system relies. The Court
has recognized that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to counsel is
"indispensable to the fair administration of our adversarial system of criminal
justice. ,
Meanwhile, the Fifth Amendment plea colloquy is a prophylactic mechanism
meant to ensure that the defendant properly waives his right against self-
incrimination as well as the other constitutional protections of a trial. While
the plea colloquy is an important part of the plea process, its purpose is limited
to "ensuring (in the absence of coercion, improper threats, misrepresentations,
or promises) that the accused understands the nature of the constitutional
31. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
32. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984).
33. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985).
34. Brooks Holland, A Relational Sixth Amendment During Interrogation, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 381, 388 (2009) (quoting Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line: A
Contemporary Right-to-Counsel Doctrine, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1635, 1640 (2003)); see also
Michael C. Mims, A Trap for the Unwary: The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel After
Montejo v. Louisiana, 71 LA. L. REV. 345, 369 (2010) ("[Tlhe primary function of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is to ensure a defendant's right to a fair trial by putting him on
a level playing field with the prosecutor.").
3s. Geoffrey M. Sweeney, Note, If You Want It, You Had Better Ask for It: How Montejo v.
Louisiana Permits Law Enforcement To Sidestep the Sixth Amendment, 55 Loy. L. REV. 619, 625
(2009).
36. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 168-69.
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protections that he is waiving."" From this purpose flows the court's limited
responsibility to ensure that the defendant has "sufficient understanding of the
nature of the charges such that his plea can stand as 'an intelligent admission of
guilt' and that he understands the 'direct consequences' of the conviction."38
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
and the Fifth Amendment plea colloquy serve analytically distinct purposes.
The Fifth Amendment plea colloquy is by its nature a far more limited
enterprise. In fact, the Court's rulings on the bounds of the Fifth Amendment
plea colloquy assume the existence of broader counsel provided by the
defendant's attorney, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. In Brady, the
Court indicated that "an intelligent assessment of the relative advantages of
pleading guilty is frequently impossible without the assistance of an
attorney,"39 and then, in upholding the plea, observed that Brady had been
"represented by competent counsel throughout."4 o The Brady Court recognized
that, regardless of the plea colloquy, "a guilty plea to a felony charge entered
without counsel and without a waiver of counsel is invalid." 4 1 According to
McMann and Strickland, constitutional provision of counsel means "effective
assistance of counsel."" Thus, in Brady, where the defendant pled guilty to
avoid the death penalty, if a lawyer had insufficiently advised the defendant on
the relative advantages and disadvantages of the plea for his sentence, a plea
colloquy regarding those consequences would not be sufficient. The Brady
Court's reasoning compels the conclusion that effective guidance from counsel
is vital to the defendant regardless of the breadth of the plea colloquy, which
merely ensures the voluntariness of the defendant's waiver of his Fifth
Amendment rights. In other words, the Brady Court found the limited plea
37. Brief of Petitioner at 31, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651) (citing
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n.13 (1976)).
38. Id. at 31 (quoting Henderson, 426 U.S. at 645 n.13; Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755
(1970)).
39. 397 U.S. at 748 n.6.
40. Id. at 743; see Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Effective Assistance of Counsel and the
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 697, 728 (2002); see also Brief of Petitioner,
supra note 37, at 30 ("Indeed, judges' duties to ensure the voluntariness of pleas are
restricted precisely because competent counsel will provide a broader range of advice
tailored to each particular defendant's needs."); Roberts, supra note 4, at 172 ("Brady
brought no Sixth Amendment claim before the Court; indeed, the decision found that Brady
'had competent counsel and full opportunity to assess the advantages and disadvantages of a
trial as compared with those attending a plea of guilty."' (quoting Brady, 397 U.S. at 754)).
41. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748-49 n.6.
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colloquy sufficient precisely because it was complemented by the necessarily
more robust protection of competent counsel.
The court and counsel's separate roles in the system align with their
distinct purposes in protecting defendants, particularly in the plea process:
"The judge is neutral, but counsel is supposed to pursue the interests of the
client." 4 Moreover, the role of court and counsel are defined in contrast to one
another; while counsel must investigate, advise, and advocate for his client,
"the court's function and duties quintessentially exclude such assistance,
advocacy and consultation."' As discussed above, the role of counsel is seen as
"indispensable" precisely because the judge, in the role of neutral arbiter,
cannot fulfill the functions of counsel. The Court wrote in Powell v. Alabama:
"[H] ow can a judge, whose functions are purely judicial, effectively discharge
the obligations of counsel for the accused? . .. [A judge] cannot investigate the
facts, advise and direct the defense, or participate in those necessary
conferences between counsel and accused which sometimes partake of the
inviolable character of the confessional."4 In the plea process, the judge
cannot, and should not, investigate facts, determine the goals of the client, and
negotiate with the prosecutor to achieve the best outcome. These are tasks
quintessentially left to defense counsel.
C. The Collateral Consequences Rule: Inattention to the Distinct Roles of Courts
and Counsel in the Plea Context Leading to the Padilla Challenge
The previous Section demonstrated the important doctrinal and normative
distinctions between the role of the courts in the plea colloquy and the role of
counsel in the plea context. However, prior to Padilla, the lower courts,
without giving due consideration to these distinctions, imported wholesale the
collateral consequences rule -which limited the responsibilities of the court in
plea colloquies-into the Sixth Amendment context, thereby limiting the
responsibilities of counsel. According to the collateral consequences rule,
neither court nor counsel is required to advise a defendant of any collateral
consequence of a conviction before she enters a guilty plea. Since courts
considered deportation to be a collateral consequence of a conviction, courts
categorically held that effective assistance of counsel did not encompass advice
43. Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Love, Status as Punishment: A Critical Guide to Padilla v.
Kentucky, 25 CRIM. JUST. 21, 28 (2010).
44. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 37, at 32 (quoting In re Resendiz, 19 P.3 d 1171, 1182 (Cal.
2001)).
45. 287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932).
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on the deportation consequences of pleas. This state of affairs led to the
challenge in Padilla v. Kentucky. The importation of the collateral consequences
rule into the Sixth Amendment context demonstrates how courts, by paying
scant attention to the distinct functions of court and counsel in the plea
context, may inappropriately narrow the protection of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel by equating its role with that of the court during the plea
colloquy.46
As discussed above, the Fifth Amendment requires that a guilty plea be
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.47 It is the court's responsibility, through
the plea colloquy, to ensure that all accepted pleas are indeed knowing and
voluntary.48 In Brady v. United States, the Court held that the voluntariness of
the plea hinged on the defendant's knowledge of the "direct consequences" of
the plea.49 The lower courts interpreted this holding to mean, by negative
implication, that courts need not inform defendants of indirect, or collateral,
consequences of the plea.so The category of collateral consequences includes sex
offender registration, loss of welfare benefits, license revocation, and other job
46. Scholars have made similar prudential arguments regarding inattention to the distinct
functions of Fifth Amendment prophylactic rules and the broader Sixth Amendment right
to counsel in urging the Court to reconsider its decision in Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778
(2009). Montejo overturned the rule established in Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625
(1986) -that after assertion of the right to counsel in an arraignment or other proceeding,
any waiver of the right to counsel where police initiated interrogation is presumptively
invalid. Scholars argue that Sixth Amendment concerns, distinct from Fifth Amendment
concerns arising out of the Fifth Amendment's more limited "right to counsel" in
interrogation scenarios, were ignored in the Montejo Court's analysis. See, e.g., Mims, supra
note 34; Sweeney, supra note 35. These prudential arguments are noteworthy; however,
Montejo arose out of an entirely different doctrinal context than Padilla.
47. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
48. FED. R. CluM. P. n(b)(2); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
49. 397 U.S. at 755 ("The standard as to the voluntariness of guilty pleas must be essentially that
defined by Judge Tuttle of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit: '[A] plea of guilty
entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any
commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless
induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation
(including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their
nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g.
bribes)."' (emphasis added) (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958))).
5o. See, e.g., United States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("We note that the
accused must be 'fully aware of the direct consequences.' We presume that the Supreme
Court meant what it said when it used the word 'direct'; by doing so, it excluded collateral
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eligibility consequences." Direct consequences are often defined as those that
are "automatic,"" and the exclusion of collateral consequences from the plea
colloquy is sometimes justified on the basis that they are "beyond the control of
the sentencing court."" The bright line rule against requiring disclosure of
collateral consequences in the plea colloquy became deeply entrenched.' It
continues to provide guidance to courts in executing colloquies and promotes
the goal of assuring the finality of guilty pleas.
In the years following Strickland and Hill-which established the right to
effective assistance of counsel in the plea context- the lower courts adopted the
collateral consequences rule from the Fifth Amendment plea colloquy context
and applied it to the Sixth Amendment requirements of counsel. Therefore, a
rule that previously solely affected the duties of courts subsequently also
limited counsel's duty to inform clients of only the direct consequences of their
pleas. Ultimately, the collateral consequences rule was applied in the Sixth
Amendment context by practically all federal, and most state, courts.ss
Therefore, under the prevailing federal rule, defense counsel were not required
to advise defendants on collateral consequences that might significantly affect a
defendant's judgment about whether or not to accept a plea. Courts
concluded that parole eligibility, consecutive versus concurrent sentencing,
disenfranchisement, disqualification for public benefits, dishonorable
discharge, loss of business or professional licenses, and many other significant
51. Chin & Holmes, supra note 40, at 705-06.
52. Id. at 704 n-45 (quoting United States v. Littlejohn, 224 F. 3 d 960, 966-67 (9 th Cir. 2000)).
53. Id. at 704 (citing United States v. Gonzales, 202 F.3 d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 2000)).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 234 F.3d 252, 255 (5th Cir. 2000); Warren v. Richland
Cnty. Circuit Court, 223 F. 3d 454, 457 ( 7th Cir. 2000); Bargas v. Burns, 179 F.3d 1207, 1216
( 9th Cir. 1999) ("A trial court is not required to inform a defendant of all of the
consequences of his plea; instead this Court only will find a due process violation where the
trial court failed to inform a defendant of the direct consequences of his plea, as opposed to
the collateral consequences."); see also 9 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYER'S EDITION § 22:933
(2011) (explaining the collateral consequences rule for plea colloquies).
ss. See Chin & Holmes, supra note 40, at 706-08 (noting that, as of 2002, the collateral
consequence rule was accepted in the Sixth Amendment context in the "Courts of Appeals
for the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and
District of Columbia Circuits, and by the Army Court of Military Review. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia has accepted the rule, as have courts in Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin").
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consequences fell under the blanket category of collateral consequences."
When Padilla was decided, the ten federal circuit courts that had confronted
the particular question of whether the Sixth Amendment required criminal
defense lawyers to advise their clients of the immigration consequences of a
guilty plea had ruled that defense lawyers had no such obligation because
immigration consequences were collateral to the plea." Seventeen state court
jurisdictions agreed.'" Only three courts, all state courts, had ever recognized
such a requirement under the Sixth Amendment."
Although the collateral consequences rule became widely accepted by the
circuit courts, the Supreme Court itself had never applied the collateral
consequences distinction to a Sixth Amendment case (a fact the Court noted in
its opinion in Padilla v. Kentucky) .6o The only guidance available to lower
courts was the Supreme Court's decision in Hill v. Lockhart.6 1 The lower court
in Hill had dismissed the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim on
the basis that parole eligibility was a collateral consequence about which the
s6. Id. at 705.
57. Brief of Criminal and Immigration Law Professors et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at lo-11, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473
(2olo) (No. o8-651) [hereinafter Brief of Criminal and Immigration Law Professors] (citing
Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F. 3d 327 (5th Cir. 2008); Yong Wong Park v. United
States, 222 Fed. App'x 82 (2d Cir. 2007); Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251 (ioth Cir.
2004); United States v. Fry, 322 F. 3 d 1198 (9th Cit. 2003); Gumangan v. United States,
254 F. 3d 701 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3 d 20 (1st Cit. 2000); United
States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d ss, 59 (D.C. Cit. 1990); Santos v. Kolb, 88o F.2d 941 (7 th
Cit. 1989), superseded by statute, Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, S 55(b),
104 Stat. 4978, 5050 (1990); United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6 (4 th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764 (iith Cit. 1985)).
58. Id. (citing Oyekoya v. State, 558 So. 2d 990 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989); Tafoya v. State,
5oo P.2d 247, 251 (Alaska 1972); State v. Rosas, 904 P.2d 1245 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Major v.
State, 814 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2002); Williams v. Duffy, 513 S.E.2d 212 (Ga. 1999); People v.
Huante, 571 N.E.2d 736, 741 (Ill. 1991); Mott v. State, 407 N.W.2d 581, 583 (Iowa 1987);
State v. Muriithi, 46 P.3 d 1145, 1152 (Kan. 2002); Commonwealth v. Fuartado, 170 S.W. 3d
384 (Ky. 2005); State v. Montalban, 81o So. 2d 11o6 (La. 2002); Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d
573, 579 (Minn. 1998); State v. Zarate, 651 N.W.2d 215 (Neb. 2002); Barajas v. State,
991 P.2d 474 (Nev. 1999); State v. Dalman, 520 N.W.2d 86o (N.D. 1994); Commonwealth
v. Frometa, 555 A.2d 92 (Pa. 1989); Nikolaev v. Weber, 705 N.W.2d 72 (S.D. 2005); State v.
McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)).
59. Id. at 12 (citing People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 527 (Colo. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 746 P.2d
523 (1987) (en banc); State v. Paredez, 101 P.3 d 799, 8o5 (N.M. 2004); State v. Creary,
No. 82767, 2004 WL 351878, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2004)).
6o. 130 S. Ct. at 1481.
61. 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
958
121:944 2012
PADILLA V. KENTUCKY: THE EFFECT OF PLEA COLLOOUY WARNINGS
attorney did not have to advise his client.6 ' Rather than affirming the decision
below by applying the rigid collateral consequences rule, the Court made clear
that the two-part test of Strickland should apply." However, Hill did not
definitively resolve the collateral consequences question because the Court
dismissed the case under the prejudice prong: "We find it unnecessary to
determine whether there may be circumstances under which erroneous advice
by counsel as to parole eligibility may be deemed constitutionally ineffective
assistance of counsel, because in the present case we conclude that petitioner's
allegations are insufficient to satisfy the . .. requirement of 'prejudice."' 6" As
discussed above, lower courts persisted in their application of the collateral
consequences rule to the Sixth Amendment context after the (ambiguous)
ruling in Hill touched upon the question.
By defining a lawyer's responsibilities as equivalent to the duties of the
court in a plea colloquy, the lower courts denigrated the robust role defense
counsel is meant to play in ensuring a fair criminal process by advising
defendants of their best options and, essentially, made the role of the lawyer in
the plea process superfluous.6 5 As Gabriel Chin and Richard Holmes forcefully
argued in a 2002 article,66 the collateral consequences rule does not rely upon
the supposition that collateral consequences are irrelevant to a defendant's
decision, but rather that defense counsel is better suited than courts to provide
this advice. Therefore, the importation of the collateral consequences rule into
the Sixth Amendment was inapposite since the rule did "not capture, even as a
rule of thumb, anything important about the concerns of competent lawyers or
their clients.""' It was precisely this conflation between the role of the court
and the role of counsel that the petitioners in Padilla challenged; the
petitioner's brief argued that "the collateral-consequences doctrine originated
from Rule n1 jurisprudence to define the duties of a court with regard to guilty
pleas. It has no bearing on the distinct and more far-reaching duties of defense
62. Id. at 55 (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 731 F.2d 568, 570-73 (8th Cir. 1984)).
63. Id. at 58 ("We hold, therefore, that the two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to
challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.").
64. Id. at 6o.
65. See Chin & Holmes, supra note 40, for a useful critique of the importation of the collateral
consequences rule into the Sixth Amendment.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 712.
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counsel with which the Sixth Amendment is concerned.""8 For the most part,
the Padilla Court agreed."
II. PADILLA V. KENTUCKY, REJECTING THE COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES RULE AND THE DANGER THAT PLEA
COLLOQUIES WILL BAR PREJUDICE
A. Padilla v. Kentucky: Rejecting the Collateral Consequences Rule
Jose Padilla, originally from Honduras, was a forty-year legal resident of
the United States and a veteran of the Vietnam War. He was arrested for
transporting marijuana and pled guilty to the charges against him. When
Padilla asked his attorney about the effect a plea might have on his
immigration status, his attorney told him, incorrectly, that he "did not have to
worry about immigration status since he had been in the country so long." 0
Subsequently, when he faced deportation, Padilla brought a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel seeking to have his plea vacated. He argued that if his
attorney had correctly advised him of the mandatory deportation consequences
of his plea, he would have insisted on going to trial. The Supreme Court of
Kentucky ruled that Padilla could not seek relief because immigration
consequences were "collateral" to the plea and therefore neither silence nor
affirmative misadvice of counsel was sufficient to prove ineffective assistance of
counsel." The Kentucky court's ruling was out of line with most lower courts;
most courts recognized an affirmative misadvice exception to the collateral
consequences rule."
In Padilla v. Kentucky, a pivotal decision affecting both criminal procedure
and immigration policy, the Supreme Court held that criminal defense lawyers
have an affirmative obligation under the Sixth Amendment to advise their
68. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 37, at 25.
69. The Court noted that it had never before applied the collateral consequence rule and did not
apply it in Padilla. However, the Court avoided technically addressing the question of
whether the rule is ever appropriate in the Sixth Amendment context. Padilla v. Kentucky,
130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010). After Padilla, it is at least clear that the collateral consequences
rule cannot always govern the analysis under the first prong of Strickland.
70. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
71. Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W. 3 d 482, 484-85 (Ky. 20o8), rev'd 130 S. Ct. 1473.
72. See Brief of Criminal and Immigration Law Professors, supra note 57, at 13-14 (noting that
only two courts, including Kentucky, had ruled that affirmative misadvice on collateral
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clients of the immigration consequences of their pleas. When the deportation
consequence is "succinct, clear, and explicit," lawyers have a duty to explain
that consequence correctly.73 Where the deportation consequence is uncertain
or unclear, lawyers have a duty to warn a noncitizen of possible adverse
immigration consequences and refer her to an immigration lawyer.74 The
Padilla Court refused to adopt the lower court's bright line approach, stating:
"We . . . have never applied a distinction between direct and collateral
consequences to define the scope of constitutionally 'reasonable professional
assistance' required under Strickland."7 ' Rather than directly abrogating the
collateral consequences rule, the Padilla Court focused on the "unique nature of
deportation, particularly its severity and intimate relationship to the
criminal process. The Court determined that the "collateral versus direct
distinction is thus ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the
specific risk of deportation. Therefore, at minimum, advice regarding the
collateral consequences of deportation must be analyzed under the ordinary
two-prong test of Strickland. Further, the logic of Padilla tracks the
reasonableness standard of Strickland, suggesting that where other collateral
consequences are serious enough that a reasonable lawyer would address them,
a failure to address them also violates the Sixth Amendment.
Professional standards such as the American Bar Association standards and
the guidelines of National Legal Aid and Defender Association require defense
counsel to warn noncitizens of the immigration consequences of conviction.8
Under the first prong of Strickland, the Padilla Court found that these
professional recommendations sufficiently show the existence of an obligation
under the Sixth Amendment.79 Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that its
own jurisprudence had recognized that defendants had a reasonable
expectation of such advice. In INS v. St. Cyr,so the Court had noted that
"[p]reserving the client's right to remain in the United States may be more
73. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483.
74. Id. at 1490.
75. Id. at 1481 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1482.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1482-83.
8o. 533 U.S. 289 (2oo), superseded by statute, REAL ID Act of 2005 § io6(a), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(5) (2oo6).
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important to the client than any potential jail sentence,"" and indicated its
expectation that counsel would "follow[] the advice of numerous practice
guides and . .. advise[] him" of the important immigration consequences of a
plea offer." The Padilla Court rejected the "affirmative misadvice" rule, which
some courts had previously adopted and which the Solicitor General
recommended to the Court," whereby only affirmative misadvice, not silence,
would constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court reasoned that the
rule would create two "absurd results": (1) it would encourage silence on the
part of lawyers on a matter of importance to the client, and (2) "it would deny a
class of clients least able to represent themselves the most rudimentary advice
on deportation even when it is readily available."81 Finally, the Court dismissed
any "floodgates" concerns that might be raised by recognizing an additional
ground on which defendants can collaterally attack their convictions after they
are final. The Court relied on the high bar of the prejudice prong of Strickland,
which adequately eliminates "specious claims.""' The Court then remanded the
case for further hearings on the second prong of Strickland: prejudice.
B. The Plea Colloquy Warning: An Effective Barrier to Successful Padilla
Claims?
There are many ways in which the lower courts may cabin -and in many
cases already have cabined -the reach of the Padilla decision. Part III discusses
the various ways in which courts have addressed the plethora of questions
raised by the Court's decision. This Note focuses on one way that courts may
limit Padilla: by using plea colloquy warnings to "cure" Padilla violations and
bar findings of prejudice. The idea of using plea colloquies to "cure" Padilla
violations has the potential to reintroduce inattention to the separate roles of
court and counsel in the plea context, a confusion that the Supreme Court
sought to resolve in Padilla by rejecting the collateral consequences rule.
Further, it threatens to drastically change the practical effects of the decision.
Although advisement of immigration consequences in a plea colloquy is not
required under Rule 11 or the Fifth Amendment, at least two dozen states have
statutes, rules, or standard plea forms that require a defendant to receive a
s1. Id. at 322 (quoting 3 MATTHEW BENDER, CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES §§ 6oA.o,
6oA.02[2] (1999)).
82. Id. at 323 l.5o.
83. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484.
84. Id.
8s. Id. at 1485.
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warning regarding the potential immigration consequences of a plea.86 That
number is likely to increase in the wake of Padilla. The traditional plea colloquy
warning is general and broad in nature. For example, the Florida rule states:
[T]he trial judge should, when determining voluntariness, place the
defendant under oath and shall address the defendant personally and
shall determine that he or she understands . . . that ... if he or she is
not a United States citizen, the plea may subject him or her to
deportation pursuant to the laws and regulations governing the United
States Immigration and Naturalization Service.87
The question these plea colloquies raise is what, if any, effect they have on
Padilla Sixth Amendment claims. Defendants will be able to satisfy the first
prong of Strickland, which looks at whether there was deficient performance of
counsel, regardless of these colloquy warnings. However, the question remains
whether defendants can adequately prove prejudice-that is, that they would
not have pled guilty if not for the attorney's deficient performance -when they
received blanket warnings from the court or sign blanket waivers on standard
plea forms at the time of their pleas.
Norman Reimer, Executive Director of the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, has raised this issue as fundamental to the survival
of the substance of the Padilla decision. He criticizes the insertion of a blanket
waiver regarding immigration consequences into "fast track" plea agreements
in Arizona, describing it as "a calculated maneuver to utilize prosecutorial
control of the plea process to effectively circumvent the Supreme Court's
holding in Padilla."8 While Reimer may be correct that these waivers are being
used in a concerted effort to circumvent Padilla, they may also be seen as
providing another layer of protection in recognition of the importance to
noncitizens of the consequences of deportation. A number of scholars have
argued that warnings regarding immigration and other collateral consequences
should be a required part of the plea colloquy under the Fifth Amendment's
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary standard for pleas.5 9 As a general matter,
86. Roberts, supra note 4, at 148 & n.116 (compiling the various state statutes, rules, and
regulations).
87. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.172(C).
88. Norman L. Reimer, Decision: Was 2010 the Year Marking a Paradigm Shift in the Role of
Defense Counsel- or Just More Business as Usual?, CHAMPION, Dec. 2010, http://www.nacdl.org/
champion.aspx?id=16247 (italics added).
8. See, e.g., Evelyn H. Cruz, Competent Voices: Noncitizen Defendants and the Right To Know the
Immigration Consequences of Plea Agreements, 13 HARv. LATINO L. REv. 47 (2010) (arguing
that courts should warn immigrants of the possible deportation consequences of their guilty
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advocates for noncitizen criminal defendants likely would support requiring
warnings from both court and counsel to ensure that noncitizen defendants are
adequately informed at every stage of the proceedings.
Whether intended to benevolently provide additional protection to
noncitizens, or cynically added to thwart future Padilla claims, these pre-plea
warnings threaten to circumvent Padilla's robust holding. In practice, they
could replace the requirement that counsel discuss with and advise defendants
on immigration consequences during the defendant's decision-making process
with a generalized warning at the moment that the defendant is entering her
plea. The plea colloquy is an insufficient protection of the noncitizen's right to
know, consider, and devise strategies regarding the immigration consequences
of her plea. As the scholar Evelyn Cruz writes: "A noncitizen warning from the
judge alone will not provide the necessary protections for noncitizen
defendants. To be confident of her decision, the defendant will need time to
consult with her attorney and hope that he/she competently advises her on all
the consequences of the proposed plea."9o
Practitioners and scholars alike have expressed doubts about the
effectiveness of plea colloquy warnings. 9' They argue that defendants perceive
Rule 11 colloquies as largely ceremonial. As a result, defendants may not realize
that they have the right to change their minds and may feel undue pressure or
coercion to finalize the plea at that point in the process.92 Given the foregoing,
some scholars have seriously criticized the plea colloquy for elevating form over
substance. Scholar Richard Klein writes frankly: "[A]ny participant in the
pleas during the plea colloquy); Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and
Direct Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of "Sexually Violent
Predators," 93 MINN. L. REv. 670 (20o8) (arguing that courts should warn defendants of the
collateral consequence of involuntary commitment for certain sex offenders during the plea
colloquy).
go. Cruz, supra note 89, at 54.
91. See E-mail from Steven Duke, Professor, Yale Law Sch., to author (May 9, 2011, 11:40 AM
EST) (on file with author) ("I would argue that in the typical guilty plea case, the defendant
has already made his decision and the Rule 11 inquiry is largely ceremonial, or would be so
regarded by the defendant. Even if he were paying attention and even if he understood what
the judge said about deportability that would not be a substitute for having been counseled
on the matter in private by his attorney."); E-mail from Manuel Vargas, Senior Counsel,
Immigration Def. Project, to author (April 6, 2011, 4:35 PM EST) (on file with author)
("What's a defendant who has been advised that pleading guilty will not affect his or her
immigration status to do when confronted with this language in a plea agreement
(assuming he or she is even given a real opportunity to read and digest it)? Refuse to sign
the plea agreement? Is that realistic in the face of the pressure/coercion he or she would
likely be under at that point to just go ahead and plead?").
92. See id.
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criminal justice system kows that the colloquy between the judge and the
defendant is scripted, ritualistic, perfunctory, pro forma, and quite
meaningless."" Without accepting that the plea colloquy is "meaningless," one
can easily accept that the plea colloquy is unlikely to affect a defendant's
decision to plead guilty at that late point in the process and thus cannot replace
the guidance of counsel in deciding whether or not to plead guilty.
Recognizing these practical realities, in defining the bounds of the
requirements of the plea colloquy, the Supreme Court has recognized the vital
importance of the advice of counsel prior to the acceptance of any plea. Despite
this mandate, the concern that courts will find plea colloquies sufficient to
"cure" Padilla violations is very real, and, as Section III.B demonstrates, courts
in a growing number of jurisdictions have already done so.
III. A DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT: THE LOWER COURTS'
IMPLEMENTATION OF PADILLA
In order to analyze how the lower courts are implementing Padilla, I
conducted a review of 265 lower court cases that have addressed Padilla since it
was decided in March 2010. This review included all cases available at the time
of citing that WestlawNext designated in the top two tiers for depth of
treatment of Padilla.94 While the review does not cover all of the decisions that
reference or rule on the application of Padilla, it likely captures a segment
sufficient to provide a reasonable understanding of how the courts are
responding to the decision in various contexts. To my knowledge, this is the
first study of this kind since the Padilla decision. It should provide both a
93. Richard Klein, Due Process Denied: Judicial Coercion in the Plea Bargaining Process,
32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1349, 1401 (2004); see also Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains,
German Lay Judges, and the Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49 STAN. L. REv. 547, 552 (1997)
("Efforts to improve plea bargaining should focus on its most disturbing defects: the
hypocrisy that reduces the public plea colloquy before the judge to a carefully rehearsed
charade during which the participants merely enact a script that was carefully crafted in the
backroom of the prosecutor's office . . . ."); Michael M. O'Hear, Plea Bargaining and
Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REv. 407, 460 (2008) ("[I]n many cases, the rituals surrounding
plea acceptance and sentencing lack real significance as decision-making processes . . . .
Procedural justice in these contexts may thus appear an empty formality and serve only to
highlight the absence of procedural justice in reaching the plea deal.").
94. WestlawNext ranks the citing references for any given case with "depth of treatment" bars
ranging from one bar, indicating minimal treatment, to four bars, indicating significant
examination of the relevant cases. This Note's dataset includes cases assigned three or four
"depth of treatment" bars for Padilla in WestlawNext.
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useful guide to practitioners litigating these cases and a starting point for
further academic dialogue on how the lower courts are implementing Padilla.
The empirical analysis in this Part begins by addressing a few threshold
issues arising out of the Padilla decision that could potentially limit the set of
cases to which Padilla can apply. In particular, it tracks how courts have
responded to questions regarding the retroactive application of Padilla, the
availability of a vehicle for Padilla claims for those no longer in state custody,
and extension of Padilla to collateral consequences besides deportation. After
demonstrating the lower courts' trend towards limiting the set of cases to
which Padilla applies, the second section of this Part interrogates how lower
courts are actually implementing Padilla, specifically whether a plea colloquy
warning prevents the defendant from meeting the prejudice prong of the
Strickland test.
A. A Trend Towards Limiting Padilla's Reach
This Section focuses on how lower courts have ruled on three key issues in
the wake of Padilla: (1) the retroactivity of Padilla's holding, (2) the availability
of a remedy for those already out of government custody, and (3) the extension
of Padilla's holding to other collateral consequences. Table i shows how courts
in different jurisdictions have ruled on these questions. The lower courts are
split on each of these issues. Since each of these are threshold questions that
will determine whether Padilla can reach a defendant's case, the consensus on
each of these questions will have a dramatic effect on Padilla's reach.
Furthermore, this overview of post-Padilla case law demonstrates a general
trend in the lower courts towards limiting the reach of Padilla's holding.
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95. It is important to note the limitations of the review of cases in Table i addressing the
retroactive application of Padilla. This analysis does not include those cases that might apply
Padilla retroactively without addressing the retroactivity concern directly. There are two
reasons for this limitation. First, where the retroactivity question was not explicitly
addressed, it is likely that it was not briefed and that, therefore, the court may not have
weighed the legal issues regarding Padilla's retroactivity. Secondly, determining which cases
involve retroactive applications sub silentio would pose practical difficulties that would bear
little fruit given the former consideration. This review also does not include those cases that
narrowly addressed whether Padilla should not be retroactively applied if it was considered a
"new rule" under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 290 (1989) (citing Mackey v. United States,
401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)), which held that "new rules" should not apply retroactively unless
they either place "certain kinds of primary ... conduct beyond the power of criminal law-
making authority" or "require[] the observance of 'those procedures that ... are implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty."' This review does not include such cases because (1) they
only conditionally addressed the retroactivity question and (2) courts are far more likely to
apply Padilla retroactively if it is not considered a "new rule." These cases arise when
petitioners bring Padilla claims after the one-year statute of limitations for habeas corpus
claims has run because the statute is only tolled if there is both a new rule and it applies
retroactively. 28 U.S.C. § 22 5 5(f) (20o6); see, e.g., Mudahinyuka v. United States, No. io C
5812, 2011 WL 528804 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2011). These cases do not resolve whether Padilla
applies retroactively more generally. Finally, the table does not capture those cases that only
mention, but do not weigh in on, the retroactivity issue but includes only those cases that
either explicitly rule on retroactivity or cast doubt on retroactivity while also ruling in the
alternative.
g6. As with the retroactivity analysis, this review only addresses those cases that either explicitly
ruled on the availability of coram nobis or another vehicle for recovery in Padilla cases or cast
doubt on the availability of such vehicles while also ruling in the alternative.
97. United States v. Orocio, 645 F. 3d 630 (3d Cir. 2011); Jiminez v. Holder, No. 10-cv-1528-
JAH(NLS), 2011 WL 3667628 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011); United States v. Hurtado-Villa, No.
CV-1o-o1814-FJM(MHB), 2011 WL 4852284 (D. Ariz. Aug. 12, 2011); United States v. Reid,
No. 1:97-CR-94, 2011 WL 3417235 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 4, 2011); Song v. United States, No. CV
09-5184 DOC, 2011 WL 2940316 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2011); United States v. Dass, No. 05-140
(3) (JRT/FLN), 2011 WL 2746181 (D. Minn. July 14, 2011); Amer v. United States, No.
1:o6CR118-GHD, 2011 WL 2160553 (N.D. Miss. May 31, 2011); United States v. Krboyan,
No. 1:o2-cr-o5438 OWW, 2011 WL 2117023 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 2011); Guadarrama-Melo v.
United States, No. 1:o8-CV-588, 2011 WVL 2433619 (E.D. Tex. May 2, 2011); United States v.
Chavarria, No. 2:io-CV-191 JVB, 2011 WL 1336565 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 7, 2011), vacated, No.
2:10-CV-191 JVB, 2011 WL 4916568 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 14, 2011); United States v. Diaz-
Palmerin, No. o8-cr-777-3, 2011 WL 1337326 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5, 2011); Zapata-Banda v. United
States, No. B:1o-2 56, 2011 WL 1113586 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2011); Marroquin v. United
States, No. M-lo-156, 2011 WL 488985 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2011); United States v. Zhong Lin,
No. 3 :07-CR-44-H, 2011 WL 197206 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 20, 2011); Martin v. United States, No.
09-1387, 2010 WL 3463949 (C.D. 111. Aug. 25, 2010); Al Kokabani v. United States, No.
5 :o6-CR-207-FL, 2olo WL 3941836 (E.D.N.C. July 30, 2010); United States v. Hubenig,
No. 6:o3-mj-o40, 2010 WL 2650625 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010); People v. Gutierrez, 954
N.E.2d 365 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011); Commonwealth v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892 (Mass. 2011);
Constanza v. State, No. Aio-2096, 2011 WL 3557824 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2011);
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Campos v. State, 798 N.W.2d 565 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011); State v. Barros, No. 07-07-oll65,
2011 WL 2314773 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 6, 2011); People v. Garcia, No. 4902/02,
2011 WL 3569329 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 26, 2011); People v. Forbes, No. 11395/1990, 2011 WL
3273520 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 1, 2011); People v. Coles, No. 8532/1994, 2011 WL 1991980
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 4, 2011); People v. Bevans, No. 20704V-2oo8, 2011 WL 923077 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Jan. 31, 2011); People v. De Jesus, No. 10335/98, 2010 WL 5300535 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Dec. 24, 2010); People v. Clarke, No. 2086/1994, 2010 WL 4809141 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 27,
2010); People v. Paredes, No. 1104/04, 2010 WL 3769234 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 21, 2010);
People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010); People v. Nunez, No. 6786/94,
2010 WL 2326584 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 21, 2010); People v. Harding, No. 99No75o60, 2011
WL 892744 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Mar. 15, 2011); People v. Ortega, No. 2008NY012378, 2010 WL
3786254 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Sept. 28, 2010); People v. Ramirez, No. 200 4 NY012 3 57, 2010 WL
3769208 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Sept. 17, 2010); People v. Bennett, 903 N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y. Crim.
Ct. 2olo); People v. Bent, No. 2009-269C, 2011 WL 1019266 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. Mar. 22, 2011);
People v. Garcia Hernandez, No. 02556/2o8, 2011 WL 846231 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. Feb. 24,
2011); Ex Parte Tanklevskaya, No. 01-10-oo627-CR, 2011 WL 2132722 (Tex. Ct. App. May
26, 2011).
98. United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3 d 630 (3 d Cir. 2011); United States v. Krboyan, No. 1:02-cr-
05438, 2011 WL 2117023 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 2011); United States v. Diaz-Palmerin, No. o8-
cr-777-3, 2011 WI 1337326 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5, 2011); United States v. Zhong Lin, No. 3:07-
CR-44-H, 2011 WL 197206 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 20, 2011); United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR
636-6, 2010 WL 3979664 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 2010), rev'd 655 F.3 d 684 (7 th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj-o40, 2olo WL 2650625 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010);
Commonwealth v. Ainalchaybeh, 17 Pa. D. & C.5th 46 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2010).
99. United States v. Rose, No. ACM 36508 f rev, 2010 WL 4068976 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. June
11, 2010); Frost v. State, No. CR-o9-1o37, 2011 WL 2094777 (Ala. Crim. App. May 27, 2011);
Wilson v. State, 244 P-3 d 535 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010); Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2010); Jacobi v. Commonwealth, No. 200 9 -CA-oo15 7 2-MR, 2011 WL 1706528 (Ky.
Ct. App. May 6, 2011); Pridham v. Commonwealth, No. 2008-CA-002190-MR, 2010 WL
4668961 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2010); People v. Fonville, 804 N.W.2d 878 (Mich. Ct. App.
2011); Commonwealth v. Abraham, 996 A.2d 1090 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010); Calvert v. State,
34 2 S.W.3 d 4 7 7 (Tenn. 2011).
1o. United States v. Chapa, No. 1:05-CR-254-3, 2011 WL 2730910 (N.D. Ga. July 12, 2011);
Llanes v. United States, No. 8:n-cv-682-T-23TBM, 2011 WL 2473233 (M.D. Fla. June 22,
2011); Ellis v. United States, No. 10 Civ. 4017 (BMC), 2011 WL 3664658 (E.D.N.Y. June 3,
2011); Mathur v. United States, No. 7 :0 7 -CR-92-BO, 2011 WL 2036701 (E.D.N.C. May 24,
2011); Dennis v. United States, 787 F. Supp. 2d 425 (D.S.C. 2011); United States v. Laguna,
No. io CR 342, 2011 WL 1357538 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2011); Mendoza v. United States, 774 F.
Supp. 2d 791 (E.D. Va. 2011); Doan v. United States, 760 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2011);
United States v. Perez, No. 8:o2CR296, 2010 WL 4643033 (D. Neb. Nov. 9, 2010); United
States v. Hough, No. 2:02-cr-oo649-WJM-1, 2010 WL 5250996 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 2010);
United States v. Gilbert, No. 2:0 3 -cr-oo349-WJM-1, 2010 WL 4134286 (D.N.J. Oct. 19,
2010); State v. Poblete, 260 P. 3 d 1102 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011); Castano v. State, 65 So. 3 d 546
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Barrios-Cruz v. State, 63 So. 3d 868 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011);
Hernandez v. State, 61 So. 3d 1144 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Miller v. State, ii A.3 d 340
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010); State v. Gaitan, 17 A.3 d 227 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011);
People v. Ebrahim, No. o8-W21, 2010 WL 4053086 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 30, 2010); People v.
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There is a very strong argument that Padilla should apply retroactively
based on the Supreme Court's retroactivity doctrine."o' In Teague v. Lane, the
Supreme Court held that "new rules" of criminal procedure do not apply
retroactively unless they fall into two narrow exceptions.o' However, where
the Court only applies a well-established rule to a specific set of facts, it does
not create a "new rule,"o0 and its holding will apply to cases on both direct and
Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d 887 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2010); Gomez v. State, No. E2010-01 3 19 -CCA-R3-
PC, 2011 WL 1797305 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2011).
ioi. Fenton v. Ryan, No. 11-2303, 2011 WL 3515376 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2011); United States v.
Jankovic, No. 90-80775, 2011 WL 1397437 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 13, 2011); People v. Barraza, No.
Ho3375 5, 2010 WL 4252684 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2010); State v. Alegrand, 23 A.3d 1250
(Conn. App. Ct. 2011); Ruiz v. State, No. 54, 2011, 2011 WL 2651093 (Del. July 6, 2011);
People v. Carrera, 940 N.E.2d 1111 (Ill. 2010); Commonwealth v. Morris, 705 S.E.2d 503
(Va. 2011).
102. Thomas v. United States, No. RWT-10-22 7 4 , 2011 WL 1457917 (D. Md. Apr. 15, 2011);
Pelaya v. Cate, No. CV 10-227 0-VBF (VBK), 2011 WL 976771 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2011);
United States v. Nelson, No. 1:o8-cr-o68, 2011 WL 883999 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 5, 2011); United
States v. Francis, No. 5 :o4 -CR- 7 4 -KSF, 2010 WL 6428639 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 30, 2010); United
States v. Bakilana, No. 1:lo-cr-ooo93 (LMB), 2010 WL 4007608 (E.D. Va. Oct. 12, 2010);
Maxwell v. Larkins, No. 4:08 CV 1896 DDN, 2010 WL 2680333 (E.D. Mo. July 1, 2010);
Eber-Schmid v. Cuomo, No. 09 Civ. 8036(BSJ)(AJP), 2010 WL 1640905 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22,
2010); People v. Hughes, No. 2-09-0992, 2011 WL 3105820 (Ill. App. Ct. July 19, 2011);
Blaise v. State, No. 10-0466, 2011 WL 2078091 (Iowa Ct. App. May 25, 2011); State v.
Romos, No. 09-0585, 2010 VL 2598630 (Iowa Ct. App. June 30, 2010); State v. Rasheed,
340 S.W. 3 d 280 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011); People v. Lopresti, No. 2003BXoo3466, 2011 WL
781409 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 1, 2011).
1o3. United States v. Hernandez-Monreal, 404 F. App'x 714 (4th Cir. 2010); Obomighie v.
United States, No. ELH-11- 7 46, 2011 WL 2938218 (D. Md. July 18, 2011); Wassouf v. United
States, No. 11-cv-51-SM, 2011 WL 529815 (D.N.H. Feb. 7, 2011); Escobar-Pacheco v. United
States, No. 7:o6-CR-92-i-BO, 2011 WL 1750762 (E.D.N.C. May 6, 2011); State v. Barrios,
2010 WL 5071177 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 14, 2010).
104. Zapata-Banda v. United States, No. B:10-256, 2011 WL 1113586 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2011);
Cox v. Commonwealth, No. 2008-CA-ooo176-MR, 2010 WL 3927704 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 8,
2010); Webb v. State, 334 S.W.3d 126 (Mo. 2011).
1os. See DAN IESSELBRENNER, NAT'L IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NAT'L LAWYERS GUILD, A
DEFENDING IMMIGRANTS PARTNERSHIP PRACTICE ADVISORY: RETROACTIVE APPLICABILITY OF
PADILLA v. KENTUCKY (2011), available at www.fd.org/pdf lib/padillao2oretroo2orevised
%203-2011.pdf; Gray Proctor & Nancy King, Post Padilla: Padilla's Puzzles for Review in State
and Federal Courts, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 239, 240-41 (2011).
106. 489 U.S. 288, 305-06 (1989).
107. Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d 872, 885 (4 th Cir. 1994) ("[W]hen we apply an extant normative
rule to a new set of facts (leaving intact the extant rule) generally we do not announce a new
constitutional rule of criminal procedure for purposes of Teague."); U.S. v. Hubenig, No.
6:o3-mj-040, 2010 WL 2650625, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010) (applying Padilla
retroactively) ("When the Supreme Court applies a well-established rule of law in a new
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collateral review.' General constitutional standards, such as Strickland, which
require case-by-case application, do not create "new rules" each time they are
applied to new facts. As Justice Kennedy explained in Wright v. West: "Where
the beginning point is a rule of this general application, a rule designed for the
specific purpose of evaluating a myriad of factual contexts, it will be the
infrequent case that yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule, one not
dictated by precedent."o' Thus, in Williams v. Taylor, the Court held that
applications of the well-established standard of Strickland are not new rules."o
The Court in Padilla applied the Strickland framework to the deportation
consequence and "merely reiterate [d] that no . . . alternative test," such as the
collateral consequences rule, "can serve as a substitute.""' Therefore, it should
not constitute a "new rule" and should apply retroactively.
Furthermore, the Court's discussion of the concern that its decision in
Padilla could open the "floodgates" to collateral attacks on conviction"' only
makes sense if Padilla applies retroactively; otherwise, there would be no
backlog of past cases that would "flood" in. The Court's response presumes
retroactive application by considering the past fifteen years of defense counsel
standards:
way based on the specific facts of a particular case, it does not generally establish a new
rule." (citing Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1992))).
108. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 4o6, 416 (2007) ("Under the Teague framework, an old rule
applies both on direct and collateral review . . . ."). There has been some question about the
lasting vitality of Teague in cases involving collateral attacks in federal courts of state
convictions after amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006), the governing statute. 28 U.S.C.
S 2254 requires a finding that the state decision either "was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States," or was "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts."
Id. The Court has made clear that the Teague analysis survives the changes in § 2254. See
Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266 (2002) (holding that courts must apply Teague retroactivity
analysis as a threshold issue). After retroactivity is established, the defendant must also meet
the requirements of § 2254. The Court has recognized some symmetry between § 2254 and
Teague. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000) (holding that an "old rule under
our Teague jurisprudence will constitute 'clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States"' (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254). However, the
relationship between Teague doctrine and § 2254 is still not entirely resolved. See Greene v.
Palakovich, 606 F. 3d 85 ( 3d Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom., Greene v. Fisher, 131 S. Ct.
1813 (2011) (mem.) (granting certiorari to determine the temporal cutoff for "clearly
established Federal law" under § 2254).
iog. 505 U.S. 277, 309 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
110. 529 U.S. at 391 ("[T]he Strickland test provides sufficient guidance for resolving virtually all
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims . . .
in. Proctor & King, supra note 1o, at 24o.
112. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1484-85 (2olo).
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It seems unlikely that our decision today will have a significant effect on
those convictions already obtained as the result of plea bargains. For at
least the past 15 years, professional norms have generally imposed an
obligation on counsel to provide advice on the deportation
consequences of a client's plea . . . . We should . . . presume that
counsel satisfied their obligation to render competent advice .... .1
Finally, in April 2010, the Court vacated and remanded Santos-Sanchez v.
United States"4 in light of its decision in Padilla. Since Santos-Sanchez involves a
collateral attack on a conviction that was final before the Padilla decision, the
Court's decision implies retroactive effect.
The majority (thirty-eight) of the cases reviewed that confronted the
retroactivity question applied Padilla retroactively," The Third Circuit, the
first court of appeals to rule on retroactivity," 6 found that Padilla does apply
retroactively. However, a significant minority (twenty) of the cases reviewed
held that Padilla does not have retroactive effect."' An additional five decisions
found that Padilla was likely not retroactive, but declined to rule on the
question because assuming, arguendo, that Padilla did apply, there was no
prejudice."' Moreover, after the completion of this empirical analysis, further
developments in the circuit courts have shifted the trend against retroactivity.
In August 2011, both the Seventh and Tenth Circuits held that Padilla
constitutes a "new rule" under Teague that should not be applied
retroactively."' Therefore, there is now a circuit split (Seventh and Tenth vs.
Third) on this question, with two circuits favoring non-retroactivity and only
one supporting retroactivity. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case
raising this question on October 3, 2011.2o
Another major obstacle for many defendants is finding an appropriate
vehicle with which to vindicate a Padilla claim. For those who have already
served their sentences and are no longer in custody, habeas corpus is not
available. If there is no alternative vehicle for relief for those no longer in
113. Id. at 1485.
114- 130 S. Ct. 2340 (2010).
115. See supra Table 1.
116. See United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630 (3d Cir. 2011).
117. See supra Table 1.
18. See id.
n1g. United States v. Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, 2011 WL 3805763 (soth Cir. Aug. 30, 2011);
Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cit. 2011).
120. Morris v. Virginia, No. 10-1498, 2011 WL 4530355 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2011) (Mem.).
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custody, noncitizens with valid Padilla claims regarding their convictions may
be deported on the basis of those convictions without the opportunity to raise
their claims. Typically, the only remaining vehicle with which to challenge the
conviction that provides a basis for deportation is a writ of coram nobis, an
"extraordinary remedy" designed to correct errors of a "fundamental character ...
'only under circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice..'"m' Thus
far, several federal courts have entertained Padilla claims through the writ of
coram nobis when the conviction was federal.m' However, several states and
some federal jurisdictions have held that writs of coram nobis are not available
for Padilla claims,' leaving some noncitizens with valid Sixth Amendment
claims without any available remedy. Table i tracks the jurisdictions that have
allowed writ of coram nobis petitions for Padilla claims and those that have
foreclosed any relief for those out of state or federal custody.
Another unresolved issue is how broadly Padilla's logic will be applied and
extended (or not extended) to other collateral consequences of conviction. The
logic of Padilla naturally extends beyond immigration consequences to at least
some other serious collateral consequences, such as registration as a sex
offender or elimination of federal benefits. However, courts have been wary of
expanding its reach. Of the twenty-four cases in this review in which claimants
sought extension of Padilla's holding to another collateral consequence of
conviction, courts extended Padilla in only nine of them.'" Those cases
extended Padilla to sex offender registration, community supervision, parole
eligibility, misadvice on the plea's effect on civil liability, and loss of pension
121. United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mh-o40, 2010 WL 2650625, at *1 (E.D. Cal. July i,
2010) (quoting United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511 (1954)).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz Palmerin, No. o8-cr-777-3, 2011 WL 1337326 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5,
2011); Hubenig, 2010 WL 2650625, at *1.
123. See, e.g., People v. Carrera, 940 N.E.2d 1111 (Ill. 2010); Commonwealth v. Morris, 705
S.E.2d 5 03 (Va. 2011).
124. United States v. Rose, No. ACM 36508, 2010 WL 4068976 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. June ii,
2010) (extending Padilla to sex offender registration); Frost v. State, No. CR-o9-1037, 2011
WL 2094777 (Ala. Crim. App. May 27, 2011) (extending Padilla to parole eligibility); Wilson
v. State, 224 P.3 d 535 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010) (extending Padilla to the effect of a plea on a
civil case, at least where there is affirmative misadvice); Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2010) (extending Padilla to sex offender registration); Jacobi v. Commonwealth,
No. 2009-CA-oo572-MR, 2011 WL 1706528 (Ky. Ct. App. May 6, 2011) (extending Padilla
to parole eligibility); Pridham v. Commonwealth, No. 2008-CA-o02190-MR, 2010 WL
4668961 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2010) (same); People v. Fonville, No. 294554, 2011 WL
222127 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2011) (extending Padilla to sex offender registration);
Commonwealth v. Abraham, 996 A.2d 1090 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (extending Padilla to loss
of pension rights); Calvert v. State, 342 S.W-3d 477 (Tenn. 2011) (extending Padilla to
community supervision requirement).
973
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
rights.12 s In the remaining cases, the courts declined to extend Padilla to
enhanced penalty and "three strike" consequences, sex offender registration,
civil commitment, reduced eligibility for parole, effects on civil liability,
employment consequences, possible use of guilty pleas in other criminal
proceedings, loss of waiver eligibility when already removable, and other
immigration consequences such as mandatory detention.126
The lower courts' limiting approach to Padilla can be seen in various other
rulings as well. As referenced above regarding noncitizens out of custody, the
lower courts have strictly enforced limitations on the scenarios in which
defendants can bring Sixth Amendment Padilla claims. They have held that
noncitizens cannot use review of their removal orders to collaterally attack the
underlying convictions supporting the removal orders."' Likewise, noncitizens
cannot collaterally attack the underlying convictions that resulted in their
removal orders during illegal reentry cases, although they can challenge the
removal orders generally.' The lower courts have repeatedly rejected
arguments requesting equitable tolling of the habeas statute's one-year statute
of limitations based on the idea that Padilla is a "newly recognized right" that
applies retroactively or that the defendant's removal proceedings constitute
recently discovered facts. 29 Thus, in effect, even if Padilla applies retroactively,
the habeas corpus remedy will be closed to those defendants whose judgments
became final over a year ago.
Some courts also appear to limit counsel's responsibility post-Padilla.
Several courts have intimated that counsel does not have an affirmative duty to
ask clients about their immigration status and have held that no Sixth
Amendment claim lies where an attorney did not know that her client was not
125. See id.
126. People v. Lopresti, No. 2oo3BXoo3466, 2011 WL 781409 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 1, 2011)
(holding that the "enhanced" sentencing consequence was not truly a "collateral
consequence"); cases cited supra notes 102 and 104.
127. See, e.g., Ramos v. Clark, No. Clo-1226-RSM-JPD, 2011 WL 321743 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 12,
2011); Alou v. Holder, No. 10-3728, 2010 WL 4316946 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2010).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Adame-Orozco, 607 F.3 d 647 (ioth Cir. 2010); United States v.
Sanchez-Carmona, No. 2:0 9 -cr-oo516-PMP-RJJ, 2010 WL 3894133 (D. Nev. Sept. 2, 2010).
129. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, No. 1:10-CV-23718-WKW, 2011 WL 3419614 (S.D. Fla.
Aug. 4, 2011); United States v. Dass, No. 05-140 (3) (JRT/FLN), 2011 WL 2746181 (D.
Minn. July 14, 2011); United States v. Aceves, No. 10-00738, 2011 WL 976706 (D. Haw.
Mar. 17, 2011); Mudahinyuka v. United States, No. 1o C 5812, 2011 WL 528804 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 7, 2011); United States v. Shafeek, No. 10-12670, 2010 WL 3789747 (E.D. Mich. Sept.
22, 2010); Sanchez v. State, No. A11-13 4 , 2011 WL 3654489 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2011);
Commonwealth v. Garcia, 23 A.3d 1059 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011).
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a citizen.13 Another court refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation where
an attorney gave general immigration advice (for example, where the attorney's
"usual practice" was "to advise defendants that a plea may have an impact on
their [immigration] status") despite Padilla's clear mandate for an unequivocal
discussion of the mandatory deportation consequences of a plea.' 1 Finally, one
case in the survey denied an ineffective assistance of counsel claim where the
petitioner claimed that his lawyer did not advise him of the immigration
benefits of a plea bargain offer, which would have allowed him to avoid
mandatory deportation, and the petitioner therefore chose to go to trial."'
B. Treatment ofPlea Colloquies Under the Prejudice Prong
Section III.A reviewed the lower courts' treatment of key threshold issues
in the wake of Padilla. This Section focuses on a question regarding the
implementation of Padilla: the effect of plea colloquy warnings regarding
immigration consequences on Padilla claims under the prejudice prong of
Strickland. This review found fifty-one cases that addressed the issuance of a
plea colloquy warning in analyzing whether a defendant could show that
counsel's deficient performance under Padilla prejudiced her case under the
second prong of Strickland. The majority of these cases considered the plea
colloquy to be significant, if not controlling, evidence weighing against a
finding of prejudice.
130. State v. Limarco, No. 101,506, 2010 WL 3211674 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2010) (per curiam);
Phillips v. State, No. Aio-1o12, 2011 WL 781197 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2011); People v.
Wong, No. 20o6QNo25879, 2010 WL 4861044 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Nov. 23, 2010).
131. Coutu v. State, No. 2008-4598, 2010 VL 3016771, slip op. at 7 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 29,
2010).
132. People v. Headley-Ombler, No. 15074/96, 2010 WL 5 64 83 12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 29, 2010).
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133. People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010); Ex parte Romero, No. 04-11-
oo175-CR, 2011 WL 3328821 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2011); Exparte Tanklevskaya, No. o-io
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oo627-CR, 2011 WL 2132722 (Tex. Ct. App. May 26, 2011); State v. Sandoval, 249 P.3d 1o15
(Wash. 2011).
134. People v. Kazadi, No. 09CA264o, 2011 WL 724754 (Colo. App. Mar. 3, 2011); State v.
Limarco, No. 101,506, 2010 WL 3211674 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2010); State v. Zambrano,
2011 WL 1660697 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 4, 2011); State v. Wray, No. 07-01-
0033-A, 2011 WL 1045116 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 24, 2011); State v. Gaitan, 17 A. 3d
227 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011); State v. Duroseau, No. 07-05-0796, 2010 WL 4608249
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 16, 2010); State v. Calero, No. 03-10-2034, 2011 WL 9325
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 22, 2oo); People v. De Jesus, No. 10335/98, 2010 WL
5300535 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 24, 2010).
13S. Boakye v. United States, No. 09 Civ. 8217, 2010 WL 1645055 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2010).
136. Hernandez v. State, 61 So. 3d 1144 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
137. Many of these cases only considered the plea colloquy in their prejudice analysis and
therefore clearly fall under this category. However, there is a judgment call inherent within
the distinction between this category and the latter (where the plea colloquy is only one of
several factors considered). Cases were placed in this category when the court most heavily
relied on the plea colloquy evidence in its analysis of prejudice.
138. United States v. Hernandez-Monreal, 404 F. App'x 714 (4 th Cir. 2010); Zoa v. United
States, No. PJM 10-2823, 2011 WL 3417116 (D. Md. Aug. 1, 2011); Zavala v. Yates, No. 2:09-
cv-00775-JKS, 2011 WL 1327135 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2011); Mendoza v. United States, 774 F.
Supp. 2d 791 (E.D. Va. 2011); Smith v. United States, No. 10-21507-Civ-COOKE, 2011 WL
837747 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2011); Marroquin v. United States, No. M-10-156, 2011 WL 488985
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2011); Falcon v. D.H.S., No. SACV 07-66 JSL (JC), 2010 WL 5651187
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2010); Gonzalez v. United States, No. io Civ. 54 63(AKH), 2010 WL
3465603 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2010); United States v. Sanchez-Carmona, No. 2:09-cr-oo516-
PMP-RJJ, 2010 WL 3894133 (D. Nev. Sept. 2, 2010); Al Kokabani v. United States, No.
5:06-CR-207-FL, 2010 WL 3941836 (E.D.N.C. July 30, 2010); United States v. Obonaga,
No. 10-CV-2951 (JS), 2010 WL 2710413 (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2010); United States v. Bhindar,
No. 07 Cr 711-04(LAP), 2010 WL 2633858 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2010); Ellington v. United
States, No. 09 CIV 4539(HB), 2010 WL 1631497 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2010); People v.
Castrellon, No. Co65185, 2011 WL 20396oo (Cal. Ct. App. May 23, 2011); State v. Davis,
No. IN-o4-o4-o374, 2011 WL 2o85900 (Del. Super. Ct. May 20, 2011); Castano v. State, 65
So. 3d 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Flores v. State, 57 So. 3d 218 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010);
Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384 (Ga. Ct. App. July 8, 2010); Chang Ming Lin v. State, 797
N.W.2d 131 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010); Cox v. Commonwealth, No. 2008-CA-000176-MR, 2010
WL 3927704 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2010); People v. Crawford, No. 2285/04, 2011 WL 1464133
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 14, 2011); People v. William, No. 5221/2o6, 2010 W 5648314 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. June 25, 2010); State v. Ikharo, No. ioAP-967, 2011 WL 2201193 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 7, 2011); State v. Yazici, No. 20ooCA00138, 2011 WL 441473 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 7,
2011); State v. Gallegos-Martinez, No. 10-CAA-o6-0403, 2010 WL 5550237 (Ohio Ct. App.
Dec. 28, 2010); State v. Bains, No. 94330, 2010 WL 4286167 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2010);
Exparte Diaz, No. 10-10-00344-CR, 2011 WL 455273 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2011).
139. United States v. Viera, No. o8-2oxo6-03-KHV, 2011 WL 342o842 (D. Kan. Aug. 4, 2011);
United States v. Aceves, No. 10-00738 SOM/LEK, 2011 WL 976706 (D. Haw. Mar. 17,
2011); Sanchez-Contreras v. United States, No. 1o-CV-4oo8-DEO, 2011 WL 939005 (N.D.
Iowa Mar. 16, 2011); Zapata-Banda v. United States, No. B:10-25 6, 2011 WL 1113586 (S.D.
Tex. Mar. 7, 2011); United States v. Gilbert, No. 2:03-cr-00349-WJM-1, 2010 WL 4134286
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1. Cases in Which Plea Colloquy Warnings Did Not Bar Findings of
Prejudice
In only fourteen of the fifty-one cases addressing the issue did the courts
make clear that the issuance of a general plea colloquy warning would not bar a
finding of prejudice. In eight of those cases, the courts granted evidentiary
hearings on the questions presented.1 40 In four, the court affirmatively found
both prongs of Strickland satisfied and vacated the plea.'41 The other two cases
were resolved on other grounds.'4 In a number of the cases, the state court was
reversing a lower court decision that denied the claim based purely on the plea
colloquy. Notably, five of these fourteen cases were heard in New Jersey
superior courts and relied not only upon Padilla but also on a state supreme
court case, State v. Nuiez-Valdiz,143 which found that, under state constitutional
law, the plea statement warning was not sufficient to cure ineffective assistance
of counsel regarding immigration consequences of a plea. This raises the
question of whether the New Jersey Supreme Court case based on state
constitutional law influenced the lower courts' application of Padilla. In states
without congruent state constitutional law, courts may be less likely to find
plea colloquy warnings insufficient to bar prejudice.
These cases focused on the generic and indefinite character of the warnings
given, in contrast to the specific warning required under Padilla in cases of
mandatory deportation. Therefore, these decisions leave open the possibility
that more specific warnings might bar prejudice. While not all cases specifically
referenced whether or not the case involved mandatory deportation, it appears
that most of them did involve mandatory deportation offenses. Meanwhile, in
all but two cases, the warning, either given by the judge or written in the plea
form, was phrased in the terms of "may" cause removal or "might" be
deported. The courts focused on the holding in Padilla that effective assistance
(D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2010); Commonwealth v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892 (Mass. 2011); Sanchez v.
State, No. All-134, 2011 WL 3654489 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2011); People v. Bahamadou,
No. 4668-1999, 2011 WL 3503149 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 1, 2011); Neufville v. State, 13 A-3d
607 (R.I. 2011); Brea v. State, No. 2010-4426, 2010 WL 5042898 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 3,
2010).
140. See sources cited supra note 134.
141. People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010); Ex parte Romero, No. 04-11-
oo17 5-CR, 2011 WL 3328821 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2011); Ex parte Tanklevskaya, No. oi-io-
oo627-CR, 2011 WL 2132722 (Tex. Ct. App. May 26, 2011); State v. Sandoval, 249 P. 3d loi5
(Wash. 2011).
142. Boayke v. United States, No. o9 Civ. 8217, 2010 WL 1645055 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2010);
Hernandez v. State, 61 So. 3 d 1144 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
143. 9 7 5 A.2d 4 18 (N.J. 2009).
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requires not only a blanket warning of possible immigration consequences, but
also, where the deportation consequence is clear, specific advice on the
particular immigration consequences of the plea.'" In both Florida and New
Jersey, courts have intimated that an edited plea colloquy that advises
defendants of mandatory deportation consequences, where relevant, would be
sufficient to cure any prejudice resulting from counsel's failure to advise on the
matter.'45
In some cases, the inadequacy of the plea colloquy was even clearer. In
People v. Kazadi, 6 while the plea statement did have a general "guilty plea may
cause removal" sentence, it only said that "certain felonies . . . could require
removal and permanent exclusion."4 ' The defendant had pled to a
misdemeanor but was nonetheless subject to mandatory deportation.
Therefore, the court found that the advisement did not appropriately warn him
of the immigration consequences of his plea. Similarly, in People v. De Jesus,"'8
the judge warned, "I must advise you that if you are not a citizen or a resident
alien, as a result of the plea of guilty, you may be deported."' 4 9 The defendant
was a legal permanent resident (a "resident alien") but was still subject to
mandatory deportation due to the conviction. The court did not address
whether the warning could cure the prejudice when it remanded for an
evidentiary hearing, likely because its inadequacy in that case was so clear.
Courts have also considered how a lawyer's advice might interact with a
defendant's understanding of a plea colloquy. In State v. Limarco,'s a Kansas
court considered the fact that the defendant's lawyer told him that the warning
in the plea statement was "simply boilerplate," vitiating the effect of the
warning on the defendant."' In two cases where the courts vacated the pleas,
they did so even though the warnings were more explicit because the
defendants had relied on affirmative misadvice, rather than mere silence, either
from their attorneys or another source because their attorneys refused to
provide the relevant guidance.
144. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010).
145. See Hernandez, 61 So. 3d 1144; State v. Gaitan, 17 A.3 d 227 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011)
(relying on Nuhiez-Valdiz's statement regarding state law).
146. No. 09CA2640, 2011 WL 724754 (Colo. App. Mar. 3, 2011).
147. Id. at *1 (first emphasis added).
148. No. 10335/98, 2010 WL 5300535 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 24, 2010).
149. Id.
i5o. No. 101,506, 2oo WL 3211674 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2010) (per curiam).
i5. Id.
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In People v. Garcia,"' the defendant's counsel told the defendant that he
was not an immigration expert and to consult an immigration attorney for
advice on possible immigration consequences. Since the defendant was
indigent, he sought advice from an immigration paralegal, who misinformed
him. Under Padilla, the defendant had a right to correct advice on the
mandatory deportation consequences of his plea from his defense counsel. The
judge, during the plea colloquy, warned the defendant in no uncertain terms:
I can't make any representations about what immigration would do and
I understand he's got independent immigration counsel and that's fine,
but a controlled substance conviction can certainly lead to deportation
and I don't want him to have any doubt about th[at] fact .... [Ais far
as I'm concerned, he can assume that he's deportable."'
Nevertheless, the court found both prongs of Strickland satisfied and vacated
the plea. The court wrote: "Until and unless there is controlling appellate
authority to the contrary, I hold that a Court's warning regarding
deportability, standing alone, while a significant factor, should not be given
conclusive and dispositive effect on the issue of prejudice.""'
Similarly, in State v. Sandoval,' the plea warning stated explicitly: "If I am
not a citizen of the United States, a plea of guilty to an offense punishable as a
crime under state law is grounds for deportation, exclusion from admission to
the United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the
United States.""56 However, because Sandoval relied on his attorney's incorrect
or misleading advice that "he would . . . have sufficient time to retain proper
immigration counsel to ameliorate any potential immigration consequences of
his guilty plea,""' the court found prejudice despite the plea statement warning
and vacated the plea.
152. 9 07 N.Y.S.2d 398 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
153. Id. at 400 (emphasis added).
154. Id. at 407 n.20.
155. 249 P.3d sois (Wash. 2011).
1s6. Id. at 1017-18 (emphasis added). While this statement is not entirely clear regarding the
consequence of mandatory deportation, it is more strongly worded than other "may" or
"might" warnings in many of the cases discussed.
1S7. Id. at 1017.
980
PADILLA V. KENTUCKY: THE EFFECT OF PLEA COLLOOUY WARNINGS
2. Cases in Which Plea Colloquy Warnings Contributed to a Finding ofNo
Prejudice
In the clear majority of the cases reviewed, thirty-seven of the fifty-one
relevant cases, courts weighed plea colloquy warnings as evidence in their
ultimate determinations that defendants could not demonstrate prejudice and
therefore had no viable Padilla claims." Some courts considered the colloquy
among multiple other factors in the prejudice analysis. For example, in Zapata-
Banda v. United States,'"9 the court laid out a five-factor test for prejudice
inquiries in this context: (1) strength of the prosecution's case, (2) presence of
a viable defense, (3) benefit obtained from the plea, (4) whether the
complained-of deficiency was cured by the court's admonishments, and (5)
whether experience or custom led the attorney to recommend pleading for
reasons not easily categorized. 6 o In addition to identifying the cases in which
the court weighed the plea colloquy as evidence in determining a lack of
prejudice, this review sought to distinguish those cases that relied either solely
or primarily on the plea colloquy from those that only relied on the plea
colloquy among other factors in finding no prejudice. While there is some line
drawing inherent in this exercise, this review located twenty-seven cases (of the
relevant set of fifty-one cases) where the court relied either solely or primarily
on the plea colloquy in determining that defendants could not show
prejudice.' 6 , Some of these cases-by ruling solely based upon the plea
colloquy without considering other factors -appear to impose a per se bar on
Padilla claims where the defendants were issued plea colloquy warnings on the
record, at least absent unusual circumstances. Flores v. State62 provides an
example of a decision that appears to impose such a bright-line rule: "The
court's warning that Flores may be deported based on his plea cured any
prejudice that might have flowed from counsel's alleged misadvice.",6 ' A
158. See supra Table 2.
159. No. B:1o-2 56, 2011 WL 1113586 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2011).
16o. Id. at *1o-12.
161. See supra Table 2. While most courts considered the colloquy or plea agreement warnings to
be relevant to the prejudice prong, others fashioned the analysis as a first prong question.
Some courts argued that the fact that a defendant initialed the "I have discussed this with
my attorney" box on the form was sufficient to refute the defendant's subsequent claims
otherwise. Other courts refashioned the first prong to ask whether the defendant was aware
of the immigration consequences of the plea rather than whether counsel adequately
informed her of them, thus importing the prejudice inquiry into the first prong.
162. 57 So. 3d 218 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam).
163. Id. at 220-21 (citing Bermudez v. State, 603 So. 2d 657, 658 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
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federal district court wrote: "Simply put, petitioner's sworn acknowledgement
in this regard is, by itself dispositive of the prejudice analysis." 6 4 This analysis is
reflective of the bright-line logic of many of the cases that considered the effect
of plea colloquies on Padilla claims. While many of these are federal district
court and state court decisions, one of the cases espousing the strong view that
colloquies cure the Sixth Amendment violation was a circuit court decision.'6 ,
In four of these decisions, the language in the plea colloquy or form
warning was entirely unequivocal, for example, "you will be deported," making
the warning more akin to what is required from counsel under Padilla. In two
others, the warnings, although not entirely unequivocal, were issued in very
strong language by the court. For example, one judge told the defendant that
the plea "could definitely make it difficult, if not impossible, for [him] to
successfully stay legally in the United States."' 6 6 But in most of these decisions,
the warnings involved were precisely the same equivocal warnings discussed
above - for example, "you may be deported" - but the courts nonetheless found
them sufficient to negate any possible prejudice arising from deficient
performance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. In several cases, the
courts did not even consider affirmative misadvice from counsel, rather than
mere silence, to be sufficient to show a possibility of prejudice in the face of a
generic plea colloquy.167
The courts reasoned that because the defendants were made aware of the
risk of deportation before entering their guilty pleas, affirmed their
understanding of those risks, and chose to enter the pleas, it would not be
reasonable to infer that "but for counsel's errors, [they] would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."'6i The courts rarely
addressed the concern raised in the cases on the other end of spectrum
(discussed in Subsection III.B.i): that Padilla holds that defendants are entitled
to more than standard warnings of the possibility of deportation in making
their plea agreements. They did not consider whether defendants might treat
the risk of deportation differently than the certainty of deportation in their
calculus regarding whether or not to take a plea bargain or continue to trial.
Nor did they consider how counsel's advice might guide a defendant's decision
164. Mendoza v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 2d 791, 799 (E.D. Va. 2011) (emphasis added).
165. United States v. Hernandez-Monreal, 404 F. App'x 714 (4th Cir. 2010).
166. Id. at 715 (alteration in original).
167. See, e.g., Flores, 57 So. 3d 218; Smith v. United States, Nos. 10-21507-Civ-COOKE, 2011 WL
837747 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2011) (finding no prejudice even assuming, though not deciding,
that there was misadvice).
168. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
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differently than a court warning directly before the entry of a plea. Several
courts distinguished Padilla in two respects: first, in Padilla, counsel
affirmatively misadvised his client; and, second, the court did not warn Padilla
of immigration consequences during the plea colloquy. This reasoning is
flawed in both respects. First, the Padilla Court explicitly extended its holding
beyond situations involving misadvice by counsel.9 Second, the Court did
address plea colloquies and did not indicate that they bar prejudice."o
Most of the courts bolstered their no-prejudice holdings with language
emphasizing the importance of sworn statements in open court. They held that
sworn statements carry "a strong presumption of verity"' 7' and that, therefore,
the court should assume that defendants truly understood the consequences
they swore under oath to understanding. Courts used the "sworn statement"
argument to reaffirm their no-prejudice holdings even where the defendants
asserted that their counsel affirmatively misadvised them. In Flores v. State, the
Florida court wrote:
A defendant's sworn answers during a plea colloquy must mean
something. A criminal defendant is bound by his sworn assertions and
cannot rely on representations of counsel which are contrary to the
advice given by the judge . . . . When the Court advises that the plea
may result in deportation, a defendant has an affirmative duty to speak
up if the attorney has promised something different. 72
The court therefore held that through this colloquy the defendant "assumed
the risk" of deportation. 7 1
The extreme case of Al Kokabani v. United States'74 demonstrates the
sometimes mechanical reliance of courts on the effectiveness of plea colloquies
in informing defendants as well as their failure to recognize the important
distinction between possible and certain deportation for defendants'
decisionmaking. In that case, counsel had informed the defendant that "there
[would] be no adverse immigration consequences if the court sentenced [Al
Kokabani] to a term of imprisonment of twelve months or less."s1 7  The
defendant's plea bargain recommended a lower sentence, but he was made
16. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1484 (2010).
170. Id. at 1486 n.i; see infra notes 177-179 and accompanying text.
171. Falcon v. D.H.S., No. SACV 07-66 JSL, 2010 WL 5651187, at *io (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2010).
172. 57 So. 3d at 220 (citation omitted).
173. Id. at 221.
174. No. 5:o6-CR-207-FL, 2olo WL 3941836 (E.D.N.C. July 30,2010).
175. Id. at *3.
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aware during the plea colloquy that a sentence of more than twelve months was
a possibility. The court found: "[I1t cannot be said that but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, Petitioner would not have pled guilty."7 6 The court
declined to find prejudice even though the counsel's advice was incorrect: the
defendant was only sentenced to twelve months but still was subject to
mandatory deportation.
IV. PADILLA COUNSELS AGAINST CONFLATING FIFTH AND SIXTH
AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS IN THE PLEA PROCESS
A. The Collateral Consequences Rule in Reverse: Courts Continue To Conflate
Fifth and Sixth Amendment Protections to the Detriment of the Constitutional
Structure
Section III.B demonstrates that courts are repeatedly using general plea
colloquy warnings to bar findings of prejudice in Padilla claims. This Note
argues that these rulings pay insufficient attention to the distinct roles of the
court in the Fifth Amendment plea colloquy and counsel under the Sixth
Amendment, as discussed in Part I; thus, these rulings undermine the
constitutional structure that rests atop the complementary, but distinct,
constitutional protections.
Padilla v. Kentucky only addressed the first prong of Strickland's Sixth
Amendment analysis, deficient performance of counsel. It is under the second
prong, the prejudice prong, that courts have used plea colloquy warnings to
negate findings of Sixth Amendment violations when defendants bring Padilla
claims. The primary objection to this Note's claim is that courts considering
colloquies under the prejudice prong are not evaluating counsel's performance
but only analyzing all of the evidence to determine whether the performance
affected the ultimate outcome."' However, by holding that plea colloquies
176. Id. at *6.
177. Alternatively, objectors may argue that this Note's true concern is with the prejudice prong
of Strickland. This Note instead argues that within the confines of the Strickland framework,
plea colloquies represent, at best, weak evidence to defeat a claim of prejudice in Padilla
claims. However, it would be remiss not to note the wealth of scholarship highlighting the
significant concerns raised by the Strickland framework and demonstrating how it severely
limits defendants' ability to prevail on ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See generally
William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of
the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91 (1995) (providing a thorough critique of
Strickland v. Washington); see also ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 33 (1992) (calling Strickland an
"insuperable threshold"); Meredith J. Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense
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"cure" the Sixth Amendment violation, courts necessarily presume that judges
fulfilling Fifth Amendment requirements can provide the same function as
lawyers fulfilling their Sixth Amendment obligations. Counsel's role under the
Sixth Amendment is distinct from the role a court can play during a plea
colloquy. Defense counsel should guide and inform a defendant's
decisionmaking, equipping her with the knowledge to balance her options. The
court plea colloquy cannot, and is not designed to, serve these functions.""
Moreover, the plea colloquy, as discussed above, is largely ceremonial and takes
place directly before the defendant enters her plea, after she has made that
choice.' 79 It is unlikely to ever affect a defendant's plea. Therefore, evidence
that the court gave a standard warning prior to the entry of a plea is weak
evidence at best regarding how deficient performance of counsel affected the
defendant's case. The courts' frequent use of plea colloquies to find lack of
prejudice in Padilla claims demonstrates that courts continue to pay scant
attention to the separate functions of these distinct protections within the
criminal justice system. Although Padilla barred the importation of the
collateral consequences rule into Sixth Amendment standards, courts are still
conflating the protections, albeit in a different way.
By using plea colloquies to cure the prejudice of deficient counsel, courts
undermine the strong protections Padilla provides for noncitizen defendants.
In states where a general warning on immigration consequences during the
plea colloquy is mandated by statute or regulation, Padilla will effectively
become dead letter. Whether or not a lawyer advises a noncitizen on the
immigration consequences of her plea will be irrelevant to her ability to prevail
on a Sixth Amendment claim. The robust protection of the Sixth Amendment,
meant to ensure the integrity of the criminal process, will be replaced by Fifth
Amendment plea colloquy warnings that cannot possibly play the same role in
our criminal justice system. Moreover, the structure for recognizing Sixth
Amendment violations will no longer align whatsoever with the substantive
expectations of defense lawyers established by the first prong of the Sixth
Amendment. To the extent that the Sixth Amendment is meant to set the bar
for minimally proficient counsel, it will no longer serve that function with
respect to immigration consequences.
Even where colloquies are more informative-for example, where they
indicate that deportation is a mandatory consequence for conviction of the
crime at issue -the colloquy cannot substitute for the advice of counsel because
Attorneys: A System in Need of Reform, 2002 BYU L. REV. 1, 19 (arguing that Strickland
weakened constitutional protection for the right to counsel).
178. See supra Section I.B.
179. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
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of the court's structural role in the system. A judge cannot satisfactorily
investigate the defendant's individual situation, gauge the importance of plea
consequences to the defendant, and advise the defendant based on that
information. That is the province of an attorney: the defendant's advocate. In
Gideon v. Wainwright, so the Court rejected its prior rule whereby an appointed
counsel was only required when "special circumstances" made one necessary to
ensure a fair trial. The Court in Gideon recognized that in our adversarial
system, the court alone cannot ensure the fairness of any criminal process;
"lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.""' Today, the vital
Sixth Amendment mandate is not the right to counsel pro forma but the right
to effective assistance of counsel."' As the Court did in Gideon, courts should
continue to reject the premise that courts can fulfill the role of defense counsel
in ensuring a fair criminal process, be it in the plea stage-where most
convictions occur -or at trial.
The following Section argues that in addition to conflating the role of the
court in the Fifth Amendment-mandated plea colloquy and the role of counsel
under the Sixth Amendment, the lower courts' use of plea colloquies to negate
prejudice in Padilla claims directly contradicts the language, logic, and history
of Padilla itself.
B. The Ruling in Padilla Does Not Allow Plea Colloquies To "Cure" Prejudice
The language, logic, and history of Padilla all counsel against conflating the
Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections in the prejudice context. First, the
claim at issue in Padilla arose because of the lower courts' prior conflation of
the rights in this area with respect to the collateral consequences rule. Although
the Court declined to directly address and quash the importation of the rule
into the Sixth Amendment context, the Court's opinion states: "We, however,
have never applied a distinction between direct and collateral consequences to
define the scope of constitutionally 'reasonable professional assistance'
required under Strickland."'" Further, the logic of Padilla essentially rejects the
bright-line collateral consequences rule, opting instead to apply the general
standard of Strickland; where collateral consequences are so drastic and
18o 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
181. Id. at 344.
182. See Symposium, Gideon at 40: Facing the Crisis, Fulfilling the Promise, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
135 (2004).
183. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 689 (1984)).
986
PADILLA V. KENTUCKY: THE EFFECT OF PLEA COLLOOUY WARNINGS
immediate that any reasonable lawyer would advise his client of them, the
Sixth Amendment requires counsel to explain these consequences. By rejecting
the rigid collateral consequences rule, designed to address the responsibility of
the court, and instead applying the Strickland standard, which measures
counsel's performance against prevailing professional norms to determine what
advice a lawyer should provide, the Court recognized the broader role defense
counsel plays in advising defendants in the plea context. Therefore, the history
and logic of Padilla suggest that the court cannot fill the intended role of
counsel in informing the defendant of the immigration consequences of her
plea.
Second, the Padilla Court contemplated the affirmative misadvice rule and
rejected it because it wanted to avoid the "absurd result" of creating an
incentive for silence on the part of counsel.' 84 "Silence under these
circumstances," the Court wrote, "would be fundamentally at odds with the
critical obligation of counsel to advise the client of 'the advantages and
disadvantages of a plea agreement."',
8 s
Holding that plea colloquies "cure" Sixth Amendment deficiencies arguably
leads to the same "absurd result" whereby the law no longer encourages
lawyers to impart immigration advice rather than remain silent. While many
defense lawyers may not engage in this individual calculus, where Padilla
effectively becomes a dead letter due to plea colloquy warnings, the decision
will likely no longer serve the long-term norm-setting functions for the defense
bar that it would otherwise. In this manner, the law would create the "absurd
result" of encouraging silence just as the affirmative misadvice rule would.
Further, the individual and specific counsel that Padilla mandates compels
the conclusion that generalized warnings can never alone "cure" the deficient
performance of counsel. By their nature, plea colloquy warnings are general;
courts often cannot determine whether a specific defendant will be subject to
mandatory detention or deportation, and therefore their warnings say nothing
more than that the plea "may" carry adverse immigration consequences. As the
American Immigration Lawyers Association argued in an amicus brief for a
Florida case: "It defies logic to hold that a warning from a court, which would
be unconstitutional if offered by counsel, could cure constitutionally deficient
advice by counsel." 8 6
184. Id. at 1484.
185. Id. (quoting Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50-51 (1995)).
186. Brief of Am. Immigrant Lawyers Ass'n, S. Fla. Chapter, as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellant's Motion for Rehearing at 9, Flores v. State, 57 So. 3d 218 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2010) (No. 4 Do8- 3 866).
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Even where warnings are more specific, judges, given their position, cannot
gauge defendants' priorities, counsel defendants on how to proceed, or use the
information strategically in negotiating pleas. The Padilla Court specifically
contemplated the use of this information not only to inform a defendant's
ultimate choice, but also to inform defense strategy. Justice Stevens wrote:
"Counsel who possess the most rudimentary understanding of the deportation
consequences . .. may be able to plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor in
order to craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the likelihood of
deportation.""' As discussed above, a rule finding that plea colloquies "cure"
prejudice and bar Padilla claims would not lead to the various strategic
benefits, such as bargaining, that flow from defense counsel's knowledge of,
and engagement with, the immigration consequences of convictions.
Justice Alito's opinion, concurring in the judgment, reinforces the
argument that the majority opinion in Padilla does not permit the use of
general plea colloquies on immigration consequences to cure deficient
performance of counsel. Unlike the majority opinion, which clearly focused on
the role of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, Justice Alito's concurrence
perpetuated the conflation of Fifth and Sixth Amendment concerns. While
discussing the right to counsel, Justice Alito focused primarily on the
voluntariness of the plea, and thus was primarily concerned with
misrepresentation: " [W]hen a defendant bases the decision to plead guilty on
counsel's express misrepresentation that the defendant will not be removable ...
it seems hard to say that . .. it embodies a voluntary and intelligent decision to
forsake constitutional rights." 8 He disagreed with the majority's broader
holding that defense counsel must accurately and specifically advise a
defendant of the immigration consequence of her plea.'"9 He argued that the
Court's broad ruling would "head off more promising ways of addressing the
underlying problem-such as statutory or administrative reforms requiring
trial judges to inform a defendant on the record that a guilty plea may carry
adverse immigration consequences.""'o In essence, Justice Alito's opinion
suggested that plea colloquies would resolve the "underlying problem" in
Padilla.1'9 This position aligns with his view that the difficulty in Padilla was
187. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486.
188. Id. at 1493 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia noted, and criticized, this
conflation in his dissent. Id. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I do not agree with the Court that the
attorney must attempt to explain what those [immigration] consequences may be.").
190. Id. at 1491.
191. Id.
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that the plea was not voluntary, a Fifth Amendment concern. However, the
majority opinion rejected this limited approach, as Justice Alito recognized in
his opinion. Instead, the Court reinforced the significant responsibility of
defense counsel as an advisor, "leveling the playing field" and protecting the
defendant. If courts allow plea colloquies to categorically "cure" Padilla
violations, the result will essentially be a vindication of Justice Alito's opinion,
which was only joined by Chief Justice Roberts, over the majority opinion,
which was joined by five Justices.
Finally, the Court in Padilla actually considered the use of plea colloquies
and plea forms to warn immigrants of the possible deportation consequences
of their pleas. The Court cited to the many states, including Kentucky, that
currently provide such warnings through plea forms or colloquies.' Given
Justice Alito's argument that plea colloquies would resolve the Padilla problem,
it seems unlikely that the Court would refer to these colloquies and fail to
address in any fashion how they interact with the Sixth Amendment rule it was
creating (although the prejudice question itself was not squarely presented).
Furthermore, the Court did comment on these colloquies, concluding that their
use "only underscores how critical it is for counsel to inform a noncitizen client
that he faces a risk of deportation."99 Lower courts should heed the foregoing
and recognize that, although Padilla did not reach Strickland's prejudice prong,
its language and logic strongly suggest that general plea colloquies cannot cure
the prejudice of Padilla violations.
V. PROTECTING THE PADILLA DECISION IS FUNDAMENTAL TO
IMMIGRANT RIGHTS AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM
The circumvention of Padilla and noncitizens' Sixth Amendment rights will
have particularly crushing consequences in today's social and legal
environment. In particular, three factors indicate that the Padilla holding must
be retained in its most robust form: (1) the predominance of plea bargaining in
resolving criminal charges, (2) the harshness of the immigration laws
regarding the deportation of those convicted of crimes, and (3) the lack of a
right to representation in removal proceedings.
192. Id. at 1486 (Stevens, J.).
193. Id. (emphasis added).
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A. The Prevalence ofPlea Bargaining in the Criminal System
The vast majority of criminal convictions result from guilty pleas. While
much of the public associates the criminal justice system with the criminal trial
and all of its inherent protections, in reality criminal defendants rarely see their
cases go to trial. In 2009, more than 96% of all federal criminal convictions
were the result of guilty pleas.'" That number has held steady for the past ten
years.'95 Pleas are similarly prevalent in the states. The Bureau of Justice
Statistics estimated that approximately 94% of felony offenders in state courts
plead guilty.'96 Given the consistent prevalence of pleas over criminal trials,
Robert Scott and William Stuntz's 1992 statement-that the plea process "is
not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice
system" -continues to be an apt description of our system."'
We might be particularly wary of eroding Sixth Amendment rights in the
plea bargain context since it lacks the ordinary protections for criminal
defendants and truth-finding functions of the criminal trial . Some scholars
have argued that the plea process "undermines the integrity of the criminal
justice system" by eliminating these protections and allowing pleas, which
arguably may sometimes be coerced due to the imbalance of bargaining power
inherent in the process.'99 Since defendants forgo many of the protections of a
criminal trial that safeguard our system when they decide to enter a guilty plea,
we might consider it all the more important to maintain a robust right to
194. GLENN R. SCHMITT, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES
FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 3 (2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Research
Publications/2010/201012 3oFYo9_OverviewFederalCriminal Cases.pdf.
195. Id.
196. SEAN ROSEMERKEL, MATTHEW DuRoSE & DONALD FAROLE, JR., BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006, at 24 (2009), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssco6st.pdf.
197. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912
(1992); see also Jennifer L. Mnookin, Uncertain Bargains: The Rise of Plea Bargaining in
America, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1721, 1722 (2005) (quoting Scott & Stuntz, supra).
198. See, e.g., Nirej Sekhon, Willing Suspects and Docile Defendants: The Contradictory Role of
Consent in Criminal Procedure, 46 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 118 (2011) ("Criminal trials
are rare because the vast majority of criminal cases filed in the United States are resolved
through plea bargains. This is ironic because the procedural protections that are attendant
to trial underwrite our confidence in a defendant's guilt and, thereby, justify punishment."
(citation omitted)).
199. Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Comment, Should We Really "Ban" Plea Bargaining?: The Core
Concerns of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 767-72 (1998) (summarizing the
primary critiques of the plea bargaining system).
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counsel in reaching that decision. In other words, without the other safeguards
of a criminal trial, the Sixth Amendment does even more work in ensuring a
fair adversarial process by "leveling the playing field."2 oo Regardless of one's
normative position on plea bargaining, given the prevalence of guilty pleas as
the method of resolving criminal cases, the legal community should be
concerned with ensuring adequate safeguards within the system. Without such
safeguards, a vast number of vulnerable defendants may unwarily plead guilty
contrary to their own interests. Furthermore, without sufficient protections,
the plea process may be seen as illegitimate, undermining the legitimacy of the
criminal justice system as a whole.
B. The Harshness of Current Immigration Laws Concerning Deportation After
Conviction
As the Court in Padilla persuasively set forth, recent changes in
immigration laws - most importantly the expansion of the category of
deportable offenses through the 1996 amendments to the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) - ensure that the "'drastic measure' of deportation or
removal is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted
of crimes." 2 ' The INA makes deportable all noncitizens convicted of an
"aggravated felony";o once removal proceedings begin, deportation is
practically mandated because reforms to the immigration code eliminated
eligibility for discretionary relief for these noncitizens.203 Those convicted of
aggravated felonies and sentenced to terms of at least five years are also
ineligible for withholding of removal.20 4 Once noncitizens are deported
pursuant to their criminal convictions, they are barred from reentering the
country in the future.20 s The category of "aggravated felony," despite its name,
covers a broad range of relatively minor offenses; it has been held to include
forging a check for nineteen dollars and eighty-three cents, misdemeanor theft
of a video game valued at ten dollars, the sale of ten dollars worth of marijuana,
pulling the hair of a woman during a fight over a boyfriend, and shoplifting
2oo. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
zoi. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2oo) (citation omitted) (quoting Fong Haw Tan
v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)).
202. 8 U.S.C. 5 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006).
203. Id. 5 1229b(a)(3).
204. Id. 5 123 1(b)( 3 )(B).
20s. Id. 5 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii).
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fifteen dollars worth of baby clothes.2o' Often, the immigration laws do not
allow courts to consider mitigating factors such as length of residence or
familial connections in the United States. Therefore, a noncitizen who has lived
in this country since childhood, does not speak the language of his de jure
home country, and whose spouse and children live in the United States could
be deported-and barred from ever returning-on the basis of a relatively
minor criminal conviction.
While no amount of Sixth Amendment protection can change the
harshness of our immigration laws, it is vital that noncitizens be informed of
these drastic consequences for minor convictions before they plead guilty.
Noncitizens may be offered time served, a short sentence, or a suspended
sentence, making a guilty plea appear attractive. However, if the defendant is
informed that she will be automatically deported after pleading guilty, the
calculus regarding whether or not to plead changes drastically. In fact,
deportation is often "the most important part[] of the penalty that may be
imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes."2 o'
Furthermore, as the Court in St. Cyr anticipated, defense counsel can often use
their knowledge of the immigration laws to negotiate plea deals that avoid the
deportation consequence.2o
Much of the language of Padilla suggests that, at least in part, the Court
was reacting to the stark consequences of current immigration laws. The Court
wrote:
While once there was only a narrow class of deportable offenses and
judges wielded broad discretionary authority to prevent deportation,
immigration reforms over time have expanded the class of deportable
offenses and limited the authority of judges to alleviate the harsh
consequences of deportation. The "drastic measure" of deportation or
removal ... is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens
convicted of crimes.o 9
206. Brief for Asian American Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8-9,
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651).
207. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480.
208. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), superseded by statute, REAL ID Act of 2005 § 1o6(a),
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (2006); see Brief for Asian American Justice Center et al., supra note
206, at 28-34 (detailing various scenarios in which lawyers were able to negotiate plea deals
that avoided mandatory deportation, sometimes in exchange for sentences with greater
nonimmigration penalties).
209. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478 (quoting Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 1o (1948)).
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The Court found that, at minimum, noncitizens must be protected from being
exposed to these "drastic"2 o consequences without fair notice. The
circumvention of Padilla could lead to noncitizens receiving only boilerplate
warnings at the moment they enter their pleas instead of honest appraisals of
their circumstances from their attorneys.
C. The Lack ofRepresentation for Immigrants in Removal Proceedings
Finally, it is well-established law that removal proceedings, the
administrative adjudications that determine a citizen's removability prior to
deportation, are civil rather than criminal."' Therefore, the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel does not attach. While the INA provides for the right to
independently obtained counsel, it does not provide for appointed counsel for
the indigent.1 2 Some courts have theoretically adopted a "case-by-case
approach" to whether there is a right to appointed counsel under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments in the removal context; however, the reality is that no
court has ever held that a noncitizen meets the standards for the right to
appointed counsel in a removal proceeding." As a result, the majority of
noncitizens who are subjected to removal proceedings appear pro se. Only 39%
of noncitizens are represented in removal proceedings."' At least partially due
to the inaccessibility of many immigration detention centers -which are often
located in remote areas - and the common transfer of detainees far from their
residence, 15 that number is significantly lower for those in immigration
detention. In 20o6-2007, only 16% of those in immigration detention had
lawyers.2"'
Representation in removal proceedings is unquestionably valuable; in
many cases, it may mean the difference between removal and a noncitizen's
ability to stay in the United States. A recent study by the Katzmann
210. Id. at 1478.
211. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984).
212. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 5 292, 8 U.S.C. 5 1362 (20o6).
213. Michael Kaufman, Note, Detention, Due Process, and the Right to Counsel in Removal
Proceedings, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 113, 136-37 (2oo8).
214. Travis Packer, Non-Citizens with Mental Disabilities: The Need for Better Care in Detention and
in Court, IMMIGR. POL'Y CTR. 8 (NOV. 2010), http://www.ilw.com/articles/2o11,o224
-packer.pdf.
215. See HUMAN RTs. WATCH, LocKED Up FAR AwAY: THE TRANSFER OF IMMIGRANTS TO
REMOTE DETENTION CENTERS IN THE UNITED STATES (2009), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usl2o9web.pdf.
26. Packer, supra note 214, at 8.
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Immigration Representation Study Group and the Vera Institute of Justice
found that among noncitizens not in detention, 74% of those with lawyers
obtained a positive result whereas only 13% of those unrepresented had a
successful outcome. 17 And among those in immigration detention, 18% of
those represented had a successful outcome, compared with 3% of those
unrepresented."'
While the advice of defense counsel concerning the possible immigration
consequences of guilty pleas cannot substitute for representation in removal
proceedings, noncitizens' lack of access to counsel in those proceedings
heightens the importance of providing forewarning of immigration
consequences before noncitizens subject to the criminal justice system plead
guilty. Furthermore, to the extent that defense counsel can negotiate plea
agreements that enable more favorable immigration consequences, that lawyer
may provide the only legal assistance that a noncitizen can or will access with
regard to his or her immigration status. As Justice Stevens wrote in Padilla in
rejecting the affirmative misadvice rule, declining to require defense counsel to
advise noncitizen criminal defendants that a guilty plea may expose them to
removal "would deny a class of clients least able to represent themselves the
most rudimentary advice on deportation even when it is readily available.""'
Taken together, these factors - the vast number of criminal convictions
obtained by pleas, the harshness of the immigration laws with regard to
deportation of those convicted of crimes, and the lack of access to counsel in
removal proceedings - highlight the vital importance of maintaining the robust
protection of the individual right to counsel of noncitizens in the plea process
and ensuring that it is not circumvented by a significantly weaker plea colloquy
warning.
217. KATZMANN IMMIGRATION REPRESENTATION STUDY GRP. & VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE NEW
YORK IMMIGRATION REPRESENTATION STUDY PRELIMINARY FINDINGS (May 3, 2010),
available at http://www.nylj.com/nylawyer/adgifs/decisions/o5o4llimmigrant.pdf.
218. Id. While this study and other studies are compelling when combined with the knowledge
of how complicated U.S. immigration law is, the possibility remains that at least part of the
disparity in results is due to selection bias rather than effectiveness of legal assistance. That
is, it is possible that only immigrants with viable claims seek out legal assistance. See
generally D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal
Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE. L.J.
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1708664 (exploring the limited
evidentiary value of correlation studies in evaluating the effectiveness of legal
representation).
219. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1484 (2010).
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VI. FINAL STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
This Part concludes with a few strategic insights regarding how appellate
litigators who take on clients with viable Padilla claims can approach the
questions raised in this Note and use these arguments in their clients' cases.
Litigators can make several different arguments regarding the use of plea
colloquies under the second prong of the Strickland test. First, relying on the
need to maintain the distinct roles of courts and counsel under the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments, litigators may argue for the strong rule that the plea
colloquy should not be considered whatsoever in determining whether or not
there is prejudice. There are certain contexts in which the Court has recognized
presumptions of prejudice in the context of the Sixth Amendment.2 2 o In certain
circumstances, such as where defendant's counsel has an "actual conflict of
interest," the Court has recognized that prejudice "is so likely that case-by-case
inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost.""' Analogizing to these
presumptions, litigators can argue for a more limited presumption that court
plea colloquies do not have a significant enough effect on a defendant's choice
of whether to plead to be relevant to the prejudice prong. In other words,
litigators can argue that plea colloquies are such poor evidence of whether or
not the defendant was prejudiced that the case-by-case inquiry is "not worth
the cost." Such a presumption would not only better serve the fact-finding
process of the prejudice analysis, since plea colloquies are formalistic and rarely
influence defendants, but would also serve the larger goal of maintaining the
distinct roles of court and counsel in our system.
In the alternative, litigators can argue that while courts can consider the
plea colloquy in their analysis, the plea colloquy should be given little weight
given the concerns discussed above. Finally, if litigators lose on those two
primary arguments, they should continue to press for, at minimum, the weaker
rule that there should be no per se bar on prejudice based on a general court
warning.
The best fact pattern for a strategic assault on the tendency of courts to
consider plea colloquies under the second prong of Strickland is affirmative
misadvice from counsel coupled with a general warning from the court. In that
scenario, the insufficiency of the court's general warning, when placed
alongside more specific, but incorrect, advice from counsel, should be manifest.
22o. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (observing that prejudice is
presumed where there is "actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel
altogether," in cases involving "various kinds of state interference," and where "counsel is
burdened by an actual conflict ofinterest").
221. Id.
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After establishing the inability of plea colloquies to cure ineffective assistance of
counsel in that scenario, arguing their insufficiency where counsel is silent
should be easier to accomplish.
Finally, impact litigators seeking broad structural change and the robust
enforcement of Padilla must consider how to shape a litigation strategy that
integrates the prejudice concern identified in this Note with the other
unresolved issues of Padilla discussed in Part III. The most urgent other issues
arising from Padilla-both of which are discussed in Part III and are already
circulating in the courts -are: (1) the question of Padilla's retroactive
application to pleas finalized before the March 2010 decision, and (2) Padilla's
applicability to other collateral consequences of convictions such as sex
offender registration and civil commitment. These litigation questions will
determine how broadly Padilla will apply. Courts are likely to resist the
expansion of Padilla for fear of opening the floodgates to an overwhelming
number of cases and interrupting the finality of judgments.m' Therefore,
litigators will have to make the difficult decision of which issue to attack first,
which may affect the success of later claims. For the reasons discussed above, I
argue that addressing the use of plea colloquies under the prejudice prong may
be an appropriate first step. It will have serious implications for past claims as
well as future ones.
CONCLUSION
The lower courts' use of plea colloquy warnings to bar findings of prejudice
in Padilla claims threatens to undermine the robust right to counsel recognized
in Padilla and replace it with a generic, nonindividualized warning given
moments before the defendant enters his plea. The court in the plea colloquy,
required by the Fifth Amendment, and defense counsel under the Sixth
Amendment serve fundamentally different purposes in our constitutional
scheme. As Sixth Amendment jurisprudence has established, the right to
counsel is "indispensable"" to a fair adversarial system. The role of defense
counsel is to investigate, advise, and counsel her client through every phase of
the criminal process. The court, as a neutral arbiter, cannot fulfill this role. The
language, logic, and history of Padilla all counsel against allowing simple plea
colloquies to "cure" Padilla violations. As the Supreme Court did in Gideon,
courts should continue to reject the premise that they can fulfill the role of
222. See Chin & Holmes, supra note 40, at 736 (arguing that the floodgates concern was one of
the primary motivations for the lower courts' adoption of the collateral consequences rule).
223. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 168 (1985).
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defense counsel in ensuring a fair criminal process, be it at the plea stage,
where most convictions occur, or at trial. Litigators must remain attentive to
this issue so that the fruits of Padilla do not go to waste.
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